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1Abstract: The tremendous commercial success of drugs which scientiﬁc data suggest are of no beneﬁt
to most patients relative to pre-existing drugs is illustrative of a phenomenon in pharmaceutical markets
whereby products can become commercially successful even though their social costs vastly outweigh their
social beneﬁts. This suggests that a conﬂuence of market failures, patent laws and FDA regulation of
pharmaceuticals is creating perverse incentives that both encourage ineﬃcient allocation of resources and
decrease consumer access. In this paper, I explore this phenomenon by addressing two related questions.
First, how can incremental improvements in medications be characterized so as to identify which incremental
research should be encouraged or discouraged by patent and regulatory law? And second, which doctrinal or
policy levers should Congress and the courts use to reduce incentives for undesirable incrementalism? Part
I of this paper describes the economic and legal context that must inform pharmaceutical policy. Part II
attempts to characterize pharmaceutical innovations in terms of their social value and degree of innovation,
and thereby to identify the types of innovations that patent law and FDA regulations should promote. Part
III presents possible policy solutions for tailoring incentives to discourage undesirable forms of incrementalism
and encourage valuable forms of innovation. In particular, mandatory and voluntary comparative testing of
drugs, increasing the standard of nonobviousness for patentability, improvements to the patent application
process, and penalties for holders of invalid patents in paragraph IV challenges are explored as means to
enhance the correlation between the social beneﬁts and royalties derived from pharmaceutical patents.
2Incrementalism in Pharmaceutical Research: Incentives and Policy Implications
The practice of patent “evergreening” includes a variety of tactics whereby the holder of a patent right
extends its legal rights to a product market beyond the statutory term of the patent. This practice is
pervasive in the pharmaceutical industry. Some industry observers believe that evergreening strategies have
the highest rate of return of any business activity that brand name manufacturers perform.1 The most
widely celebrated (and in other circles, denounced) evergreening strategy was executed by AstraZeneca PLC
to protect the revenues of its best-selling gastroesophageal reﬂux (heartburn) medicine Prilosec. Prilosec
was a break-through discovery in the treatment of heartburn and became one of the best-selling medicines
in history. As the expiration of its seventeen-year patent term approached, AstraZeneca anticipated that
it would face strong competition from generics, which would result in a substantial reduction in prices and
billions less in annual revenues. In response to this threat, AstraZeneca developed a multi-pronged strategy,
of which the most important initiative was the development of a “new and improved” heartburn drug called
Nexium.
Nexium is a derivative of Prilosec: its active ingredient is one of the stereoisomers found in Prilosec. Although
a puriﬁed stereoisomer can be more safe and/or eﬀective than a mixture of stereoisomers, in the case of
Nexium, it was neither. Nor was it expected to be. The Wall Street Journal reported that the AstraZeneca
management team charged with responding to the Prilosec patent expiration believed that Nexium was
among the poorest of the many drug solutions they had considered, and they did not expect it to be any
better at curing heartburn than its predecessor.2 They thought it might be a modest improvement in
treating a less common indication, erosive esophagitis. The New Drug Application (“NDA”) they submitted
1Gardiner Harris, Bristol-Myers Lawyers Stymie Generic Rivals, Wall Street Journal , Sep. 7, 2001, at C1.
2Gardiner Harris, Drug Prices – Why They Keep Soaring — Fast Relief: As a Patent Expires, Drug Firm Lines Up Pricey
Alternative — Prilosec’s Maker Is Switching Users to a Lookalike Pill While It Thwarts Generics — Mr. Young Scrapes to
Aﬀord It, Wall Street Journal, Jun. 6, 2002, at A1.
3to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for the approval of Nexium supported that assessment.3
AstraZeneca performed studies comparing 20mg of Prilosec to a double dose, 40mg, of Nexium. These
studies showed similar or better results for Nexium. But no head-to-head trials at comparable doses showed
better results for Nexium. The FDA medical examiner’s evaluation emphasized that the head-to head trials
of Nexium and Prilosec did not show that Nexium was superior to Prilosec.4 He described beneﬁts of drug
as “comparable to” Prilosec for treatment of erosive esophagitis and better than a placebo for treatment of
gastroesophageal reﬂux disease.5
The medical community was unimpressed by the new drug. Thomas Scully, administrator of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services told doctors they should be embarrassed if they prescribed Nexium, because
it oﬀered no marginal beneﬁt relative to the older, cheaper drug.6 Kaiser-Permanente, the nation’s largest
managed care organization, refused to make the switch from Prilosec to Nexium, arguing that “Nexium is
clearly a no value-added drug.”7 Dr. Jerry Avorn, chief of Brigham and Women’s Hospital’s pharmacoepi-
demiology department wrote, “Nexium is not at all better in any meaningful way than Prilosec.”8
The prevailing medical opinion, however, was no barrier to the commercial success of Nexium. AstraZeneca
spent hundreds of millions of dollars in a successful eﬀort to move Prilosec users to Nexium. In order to
extend the period during which to move patients to Nexium, AstraZeneca defended Prilosec’s market share
by ﬁling and defending a myriad of patents on Prilosec, such as patents on the drug’s coating and use in com-
bination with antibiotics. Since the FDA approval process includes stays on the marketing of generic drugs
while patent validity is litigated, even patents which were later found invalid could extend AstraZeneca’s
3FDA, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Medical Review, Application 21-153/21-154, Dec. 3, 1999.
4Id., at 4-5, 6.
5Id., at 2.
6Editorial, Comparing Prescription Drugs, New York Times, Aug. 27, 2003, at A20.
7Harris, Drug Prices – Why They Keep Soaring, supra note 2.
8Neil Swidey, The Costly Case of the Purple Pill: The Story of One Blockbuster Heartburn Drug Tells You Everything You
Need To Know About the High Cost of Prescription Medicine, Boston Globe Magazine, Nov. 17, 2002.
4hold on the market. These delays generated millions of dollars in additional revenue from Prilosec and more
time for the Nexium marketing campaign.9 More than a year after the expiration of the patent on Prilosec,
despite the existence of a multi-billion dollar market, no generics had been launched. In fact, AstraZeneca’s
market share increased after the patent on Prilosec had expired.10 Class action suits alleging fraudulent
marketing of Nexium as an improvement have been unsuccessful.11 Today in the brand name drug industry,
the Prilosec-Nexium story is touted as a tremendous success from which valuable lessons can be drawn.12
Advising clients about how to retain market share through evergreening tactics has itself become a busi-
ness.13
The pharmaceutical industry has defended its proﬁts on the grounds that they are the well-deserved reward
and necessary incentive for the development of valuable medications that improve health and save lives. As
the Prilosec-Nexium story illustrates, however, under the current regulatory regime, drugs that provide few
or no health beneﬁts over their predecessors can generate great value for their patent owners. This situation
reﬂects a serious market failure, resulting from the interaction of numerous imperfections in the market for
pharmaceuticals, patent laws and FDA regulations. This should cause us to question whether the current
regulatory structure for pharmaceutical research distorts incentives by overvaluing certain kinds of innova-
tion.
This situation is made possible by the conﬂuence of a number of market failures, including the existence
of monopolies, informational asymmetries, and moral hazard. According to classical economic theory, an
optimal allocation of resources is reached in the market for a good when it is priced such that the con-
9Harris, Drug Prices – Why They Keep Soaring, supra note 2.
10Obesity, Fitness & Wellness Week, Generic Drugs: Biogenerics Set to Command More Than 12B, Feb. 5, 2005, at
719.
11See Drug Industry Daily, Federal Judge Dismisses Class-Action Lawsuit Challenging Nexium Marketing, Nov. 11, 2005.
12See e.g., Generic Drugs: Biogenerics Set to Command More Than 12B, supra note 10.
13For example, in 2004, as generic versions of the ﬁrst biological drugs threatened the market share of brand name drugs,
the pharmaceutical consulting ﬁrm Cutting Edge Information widely publicized and sold a report on leading manufacturers’
strategies for fending oﬀ generic competition. Cutting Edge Information, Combating Generics: Pharmaceutical Brand Defense,
available at http://www.pharmagenerics.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2006); Drug Weekly, Average Pharmaceutical Brand Saves
$40.3M with Lifecycle Management Tactics, Nov. 4, 2005, at 431.
5sumer’s marginal utility is equal to the producer’s marginal cost. Production is then at the socially optimal
level, because production takes place while marginal beneﬁt is greater than marginal cost, but no further.14
The market for pharmaceuticals, however, deviates from the classical market in a number of important
ways. First, the patent law intentionally creates monopolies for inventions.15 Where a single producer has
a monopoly on production of a good, the monopolist can produce less than the optimal amount and raise
the price above its marginal cost. In this scenario, some production that would take place in a competitive
market, for which the consumers’ marginal utility exceeds marginal cost, will not take place. This results in
ineﬃciently low production. In addition, although the classical economic model does not address ability to
pay, the high prices are by themselves a substantial barrier for consumers.
The policy justiﬁcation for the creation of monopolies by patent law is that this grant will encourage further
progress in the ﬁeld. The statutory requirements for obtaining a patent are meant to generally identify
those inventions that represent such progress.16 In the pharmaceutical ﬁeld, however, additional regulations
governing FDA pre-marketing approval can make even a patent that is likely to be declared invalid for its
failure to meet the statutory standards a useful tool for its owner, because generic entry is prohibited while
patent validity is being litigated. In industries other than the pharmaceutical industry, a patent which is
likely to be found invalid has limited value to its owners, since it cannot be used to obtain a preliminary
injunction against potential competitors. In the pharmaceutical industry, by contrast, a low-quality patent
can generate substantial revenues, and thus the industry has powerful incentives to ﬁle for such patents.
The classical economic model of competitive markets also assumes perfect information. In a world of perfect
14Edward M. Gramlich, A Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis, 12 (1990).
15This is not to say that the exclusive rights to a particular product guaranteed by a patent necessarily correspond to
a product market, however. A pharmaceutical patent holder has a monopoly on a particular product or method, but the
patented invention may have competition from other products that treat the same illness. An economic monopoly results,
however, where there are no substitutes available for the patented invention.
1635 U.S.C. §§101, 271 (2006). The Constitution empowers Congress to grant patents. (“The Congress shall have power...to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries.” U.S. Const., art I., §8, cl. 8.) Pursuant to its Art. I power, Congress has enacted a
series of Patent Acts which deﬁne the property rights to be given to inventors. Under the Patent Act, in order for a patent to
issue, the invention must be new, useful, and nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§101-103 (2006).
6information, consumers would be willing to pay more for products that produce greater health beneﬁts and
less for products that produce lesser beneﬁts. This is a particularly problematic assumption in healthcare
markets in which consumers do not possess the expertise required to decipher the pharmacological data.
Physicians are in a better position to make assessments of quality, but they are not required to study new
drug products as a condition of licensure and a large proportion learn about new drugs primarily from
drug manufacturers’ marketing campaigns.17 Even for those physicians who make serious eﬀorts to educate
themselves, data about the comparative eﬀects of drugs is often unavailable or insuﬃcient (see “Mis-valued
Innovation,” Part III. A., infra). Moreover, even if physicians are well-informed, pressure from misinformed
patients inﬂuenced by advertising may aﬀect prescribing.18 Imperfect information thus weakens the correla-
tion between the health beneﬁts of a drug and its market success.
Finally, prescription drug markets are aﬀected by the problem of “moral hazard” that is typical of markets
in which third party payers (insurers) pay for a substantial amount of the cost of the product, rather than
the consumer himself. Since insurance reduces the price of drug products to consumers, consumer demand
increases such that consumers will buy products that have less marginal value to them than they cost to
produce. Prescribing physicians also pay none of the price of the drug, so unless an insurer’s utilization man-
agement plan aﬀects their prescribing choices, they have no economic incentive to seek more cost-eﬀective
alternatives. This combination of consumer and physician inattention to price results in ineﬃciently high
demand.19
The conﬂuence of these three market failures created the imperfect market in which the Prilosec-Nexium
strategy could be successful. A manufacturer had the ﬁrst eﬀective drug in its class for which a patent was
granted and created a temporary economic monopoly. As this monopoly neared expiration, it took advan-
17Jerry Avorn, Powerful Medicines: The Benefits, Risks and Costs of Prescription Drugs, 279-281 (2004).
18See Michael S. Wilkes, Robert A. Bell, and Richard L. Kravitz, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends,
Impact and Implications, Health Affairs, Mar./Apr. 120 (2000) (surveying literature suggesting that direct-to-consumer
advertising may lead to inappropriate prescribing).
19Charles E. Phelps, Health Economics, 289 (1992).
7tage of the FDA regulations governing the approval process to prevent the entry of generic drugs and moved
patients to another patented drug. Consumers, who do not have the expertise to evaluate the diﬀerence
between Nexium and Prilosec and were shielded from direct costs by their insurance plans, were inﬂuenced
by Nexium marketing. Meanwhile, many physicians did not act as eﬀective gatekeepers. As a result, the
common assumption that a large number of people would not buy a more expensive drug unless it oﬀered a
real improvement over a cheaper drug (an assumption that would make sense in a truly competitive market)
was proven wrong.
The success of Nexium is illustrative of a phenomenon in pharmaceutical markets whereby products can
become commercially successful even though their social costs vastly outweigh their social beneﬁts. It might
be argued that although studies showed that Nexium oﬀered no improvement on average over Prilosec,
it probably was a signiﬁcant beneﬁt for a small, unknown population of patients. However, the runaway
commercial success of the drug suggests that a much larger population of people were paying for the more
expensive of two equally eﬀective drugs. It seems likely then that Nexium represents a kind of innovation for
which social costs outweigh social beneﬁts. This then suggests that patent law and related FDA regulation
of pharmaceuticals is creating perverse incentives that both encourage ineﬃcient allocation of resources and
decreases consumer access.
In this paper, I will explore this phenomenon by addressing two related questions. First, how can incremen-
tal improvements in medications be characterized in order to identify which incremental research projects
should be encouraged or discouraged by patent and regulatory law? And second, which doctrinal or policy
levers should Congress and the courts use to reduce incentives for undesirable incrementalism?
Part I of this paper describes the economic and legal context that must inform pharmaceutical policy. Part
II attempts to characterize incrementalism; what categories of inventions should patent and FDA policy
encourage? Part III will present possible policy solutions for tailoring incentives to discourage undesirable
8forms of incrementalism. In particular, mandatory and voluntary comparative testing of drugs, increasing
the standard of nonobviousness for patentability, improvements to the Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (“PTO”)
process, and penalties for using patents ultimately found invalid by the courts to delay generic competition
will be explored as means to enhance the correlation between the social beneﬁts and royalties derived from
pharmaceutical patents.
I. CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION
In order to set the stage for a discussion of the intersection of policy and pharmaceutical innovation, this
section discusses 1) the healthcare spending “crisis” as it relates to pharmaceuticals, 2) the particular im-
portance of patents to the pharmaceutical industry, and 3) the regulatory framework for pharmaceutical
research and industry responses to it.
I. A. The Healthcare Crisis and Access to Pharmaceuticals
Pharmaceutical industry proﬁts have attracted intense scrutiny due largely to concerns that rising prices
have made pharmaceuticals unaﬀordable for the middle class. Drug costs accounted for 12.4% of healthcare
spending in 2001 and prescription drugs are one of the fastest growing categories of that spending.20 From
1997 to 2001, spending on prescription drugs increased by an average of 14.5% annually, and studies predict
growth rates between 8 and 11% through 2012, reﬂecting increases in both price and utilization.21 Industry
20David Wessel, The Economy; Capital: The Misconceptions About Drug Prices, Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2004, at
A2.
21Bradley C. Strunk, Paul B. Ginsburg, and Jon R. Gabel, Tracking Health Care Costs: Growth
Accelerates Again in 2001, Health Affairs- Web Exclusive, Sept. 25, 2002, available at
9supporters argue that the primary reason for the increase in total drug costs is the availability of more
eﬀective drugs.22 Whether this claim is true or not, it is clear that increasing prices are putting the beneﬁts
of drug therapies out of the reach of a growing number of consumers, and putting increasing pressure on the
budgets of state governments.
Privately-insured individuals are under increasing pressure from rising drug costs, as health insurance pre-
miums are increasing faster than general price increases and growth in the economy.23 A study published
in 2000 reported that prescription drug prices had increased by 18.4% that year, accounting for 44% of the
increase in health costs covered by private insurance.24 As prescription drug prices have increased, health
insurers have responded by limiting coverage and increasing coinsurance, leaving individuals with mounting
exposure to rising drug prices.25 As a result, although prescription drugs account for only about 12% of
healthcare expenditures, they account for nearly a quarter of out-of-pocket costs for individuals.26
Many Americans, whether insured or uninsured, are unable to aﬀord the drugs prescribed for them. In 2000,
roughly 53 million non-Medicare recipients lacked insurance coverage for prescription drugs.27 A 1998 study
reported that 42% of uninsured Americans and 17% of all Americans reported not ﬁlling prescriptions for
http://content.healthaﬀairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaﬀ.w2.299v1/DC1 (last visited Apr. 21, 2006); Stephen
Heﬄer, Sheila Smith, Sean Keehan, M. Kent Clemens, Greg Won, and Mark Zezza, Health Care
Spending Projections for 2002-2012, Health Affairs -Web Exclusive, Feb. 7, 2003, available at
http://content.healthaﬀairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaﬀ.w3.54v1/DC1?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&author1=heﬄer&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT)
(last visited Apr. 20, 2006); Christine Borger, Sheila Smith, Christopher Truﬀer, Sean Keehan, Andrea Sisko, John Poisal, and
M. Kent Clemens, Health Spending Projections Through 2015:Changes On The Horizon, Health Affairs- Web Exclusive,
Feb. 22, 2006, at W70.
22See e.g., Doug Bandow, Demonizing Drugmakers: The Political Assault on the Pharmaceutical Industry, Policy Analysis,
May 8, 2003, at 1.
23Jon R. Gabel, Gary Claxton, Isadora Gil, Jeremy Pickering, Heidi Whitmore, Benjamin Finder, Samantha Hawkins, and
Diane Rowland, Health Beneﬁts in 2005: Premium Increases Slow Down, Coverage Continues to Erode, Health Affairs,
Sep./Oct. 2005, at 1280.
24Christopher Hogan, Paul B. Ginsburg, and Jon R. Gabel, Tracking Healthcare Costs: Inﬂation Returns, Health Affairs,
Mar./Apr. 2001 at 193-203.
25More than 40% of large employers say they are “very likely” to increase employee contributions to healthcare coverage in
2006. Gabel, Health Beneﬁts in 2005, supra note 23, at 1279-80; see also Borger, Health Spending Projections Through 2015,
supra note 21.
26Leila Abboud, Stung By Distrust, Drug Makers Seek to Heal Image, Wall Street Journal, Aug, 26, 2005 at B1.
27U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending Utilization and Prices,
Report to the President, April 2000 (quoted in Public Citizen’s Congress Watch, America’s Other Drug Problem: A Brieﬁng
Book on the Rx Drug Debate, 2003, available at www.citizen.org/rxfacts).
10ﬁnancial reasons.28 Similarly, a 2003 survey revealed that 13% of all adults (including the insured) and 11%
of Medicaid enrollees did not obtain prescribed drugs due to out-of-pocket costs.29
Proponents of high coinsurance plans (or “consumer-driven healthcare”) argue that increasing coinsurance
is a necessary response to the problem of moral hazard. The insured, they contend, now consume healthcare
services with little regard for cost. But if required to pay for some share of the cost, they will seek out
low-cost, high-quality healthcare goods and services.30 However, studies of prescription drug consumption
belie this logic. They show that cost-saving strategies which shift expenses to patients have deleterious ef-
fects on access to prescription drugs across a wide range of therapeutic categories, including those considered
“essential.”31 Having multiple chronic conditions strongly increases the probability of having prescription
drug access problems.32 In other words, increasing patient exposure to prices discourages not just utilization
that could be described as unnecessary or ineﬃcient, but also utilization that is medically necessary, but
beyond the means of patients.
Increasing costs for pharmaceuticals are also putting tremendous pressure on state budgets. Medicaid out-
patient drug spending increased 18% annually between 1999 and 2002, compared to 10% for all health
services.33 As a share of total Medicaid spending, drug spending doubled in the 1990s from 5.6% of total
spending in 1992 to 12% in 2002.34 This phenomenon has focused legislative attention on the pharmaceutical
industry at both the national and state levels. To contain increasing costs, almost all states have imple-
mented strategies to curtail use.35 In some cases, state oﬃcials have openly deﬁed federal law in their eﬀorts
28Karen Donelan, Robert J. Blendon, Cathy Schoen, Karen Davis, and Katherine Binns, The Cost of Health Care System
Change: Public Discontent in Five Nations, Health Affairs, May/Jun. 1999, at 214.
29Peter J. Cunningham, Medicaid Cost Containment and Access to Prescription Drugs, Health Affairs, May/Jun. 2005,
at 784.
30See e.g., Regina Herzlinger, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Containing the Health Care Cost Monster, Journal of
Financial Service Professionals, Mar. 2004, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ jfsp-consumer.htm.
31Cunningham, Medicaid Cost Containment and Access to Prescription Drugs, supra note 29, at 788.
32Id., at 785-86.
33Id.
34Id.
35Id., at 780; also see Borger, Health Spending Projections Through 2015, supra note 21, at W67.
11to address the growth of problem.36
Advocates for the pharmaceutical industry argue that private charity should be used to make pharmaceu-
ticals more available to the needy.37 This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the prices of many
drugs have sky-rocketed beyond the means of the middle class, meaning that the class of people potentially
in need of charitable assistance is much larger than the indigent. For example, the cost of commonly used
cancer drug therapies can cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars (see Table 1, infra) and even insured
patients often accrue thousands of dollars in copayments for these drugs.38
Table 1: Sample of 2005 Drug Prices
Major Indication Price of Year’s Supply
Gleevac Cancer $37,000
Avastin39 Cancer $100,000
Erbitux Cancer $120,000
Fabrazyme Fabry Disease $175,000-$200,000
Drug manufacturers have responded to the growing crisis in aﬀordability, not by reducing prices, but by
devising strategies to sustain the current level of pricing, while forgiving consumers their share of the price.
Most commonly, drug manufacturers donate money to charities that help patients pay for their share of drug
costs or their health insurance premiums.40 This allows drug manufacturers to charge prices that would
make their drugs otherwise unaﬀordable even to insured patients. By helping patients cover copays and
premiums, the manufacturer ensures that the patient will be able to continue taking the medication, so
36See e.g., Letter to Governor Pawlenty, Minnesota, from William Hubbard, FDA, May 24, 2004, at
http://www.fda.gov/imported drugs/pawlenty0524.html (last visited June 8, 2004) (arguing that the creation of Minnesota
RxConnect website, which facilitates the purchase of prescription drugs re-imported from Canada, violates federal law).
37Bandow, Demonizing Drugmakers, supra note 22, at 36-37.
38Geeta Anand, Support System: Through Charities, Drug Makers Help People – and Themselves, Wall Street Journal,
Dec. 1, 2005, at A1.
39Alex Berenson, A Cancer Drug Shows Promise, at a Price That Many Can’t Pay, New York Times, Fed. 15, 2006, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/15/business/15drug.html?ex=1145764800&en=e5b12b1ﬀbbbf84e&ei=5070#. (The price
for Avastin increased since the Anand article was published.)
40See Anand, Support System, supra note 38.
12the manufacturer can continue to bill the insurance company for its share of the expense. The insurance
company then distributes the costs among its beneﬁciaries in the form of higher premiums. When soliciting
contributions from drug manufacturers, these charities emphasize that the contributions lead to increased
proﬁts for manufacturers. For example, by donating $5,400 to cover a premium for a patient who needs
Fabrazyme, Genzyme can then charge the patient’s insurer for the remainder of the $175,000-$200,000
annual price.41 Genzyme’s net revenue from the transaction would be about $185,000. Consumers, of course,
eventually pay for the amount covered by insurance via their health insurance premiums. In addition, the
drug manufacturer beneﬁts from the opportunity to sell more product at nearly full price, and can take a
tax deduction for its charitable contributions. Charities report that they expect their business to expand
substantially when Medicare Part D becomes eﬀective since beneﬁciaries will have to come up with thousands
of dollars in copayments for covered drugs.42
While pharmaceutical company funding of copays and premiums solves immediate aﬀordability issues for
some patients, the data on the failure of insured patients to obtain prescribed medications suggests that it
is failing to reach a signiﬁcant number of consumers. Furthermore, such programs contribute to the rising
cost of health insurance coverage. Thus, there is continued pressure from consumer groups and insurers to
address the issue of rising pharmaceutical prices.
41Id.
42Id.
13I. B. Importance of Patent Protection to the Pharmaceutical In-
dustry
I. B. 1. Patents and the Pattern of Innovation
Supporters of the pharmaceutical industry defend the high costs of prescription drugs on the grounds that
these revenues are necessary incentives for further innovation. Strong patent protections are needed to ensure
that pharmaceutical ﬁrms can charge enough to generate suﬃcient returns for investors. Controls on pricing
or weakening of patent protection, they argue, would therefore slow the pace of innovation.43
The contention that current high prices are needed to ensure continued innovation ﬁnds support in economic
scholarship. Simulations by Giaccotto et al. suggest that research and development (“R&D”) spending
would have been 30% lower if the federal government had limited the rate of growth of drug prices to the
rate of growth of the CPI during the 1980s and 1990s. This would have resulted in one-third (or 330 –365)
fewer drugs being brought to market during that period.44 Conversely, Giacotto et al. found that R&D
spending increases with real drug prices, and estimated that a 10% increase in drug prices is associated with
a 6% increase in R&D intensity.45 Thus, policy-makers seeking to directly control prices would have to weigh
the social beneﬁts of increased consumer access to needed pharmaceuticals against the social costs of slower
innovation.46
Pharmaceutical manufacturers also argue that strong patent protection, which underlies current pricing
levels, is necessary for the ﬂourishing of pharmaceutical research. Patents confer upon their owners the
exclusive right to make, use and sell the patented invention for a twenty-year period from the date of
43See e.g., Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. Chicago L. Rev. 93, 106-07 (2004).
Mr. Kuhlik is the Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,
the pharmaceutical industry’s lobbying organization.
44Carmelo Giacotto, Rexford E. Santerre, and John A. Vernon, Drug Prices and Research and Development Investment
Behavior in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 48 Journal of Law and Economics 195, 195 (2005).
45Id.
46Id., at 212.
14application ﬁling. Patents are thus an exception to the background rule of free market competition, since
they provide their owners with a limited-term monopoly on their invention. This provides the inventor with
an opportunity to be the exclusive supplier of his invention, and if the invention is commercially viable, to
recoup his costs without competition from copycat competitors.
The common justiﬁcation for patents is that they promote scientiﬁc progress. However, the twenty-year
patent term is uniform across inventions. Despite the utilitarian rationale of patent law, Congress has not
attempted to tailor the patent term to particular types of inventions so as to ensure that inventors face
optimal incentives for invention that neither under-reward nor over-reward their contributions to society.47
Thus, it would be mere coincidence if the current twenty-year term were an optimal reward for pharmaceutical
inventions.
Patents, moreover, are not the only way to ensure that innovators can recoup their costs. The advantages of
being ﬁrst-to-market, marketing and service eﬀorts, and the secrecy and complexity of product technology
can give innovators a market advantage which allows them to recover their costs even in the absence of
patent protection.48 There is, however, both empirical and theoretical support for the proposition that the
pharmaceutical industry is particularly reliant on patent protection. Surveys of R&D managers in a variety
of industries have found that managers in the pharmaceutical industry placed the highest importance on
patents as a means of recovering the costs of innovation.49 In contrast, managers in other research-intensive
industries placed greater importance on other factors, such as eﬃciencies in production and ﬁrst-mover
advantage.50
47See Edward C. Walterscheid, Deﬁning Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7
J. Intell. Prop. L. 315 (2000) (historical account of the origin of the patent term in 17th century British legal practice).
48Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, in John
Duca, ed., Science and Cents: the Economics of Biotechnology, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2003, at 3, available at
http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papers/Other/Grabowski/Patents.pdf.
49Richard C. Levin, et al., Appropriating Returns from Industrial Research and Development, Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity 783-820 (1987); Wes Cohen et al., “Appropriability Conditions and Why Firms Patent and Why They Do Not
in the American Manufacturing Sector,” Working Paper (Carnegie-Mellon University 1997).
50Id.
15The argument that patents are particularly necessary to pharmaceutical research also ﬁnds support in the
pattern of pharmaceutical innovation. Since the relationship between the structure and biochemical function
of chemicals is so unpredictable, research is subject to an unusual degree of uncertainty and requires costly
experimentation. Once a new chemical product is discovered, it is usually easy for competitors to determine
how to copy it. The costs of imitation for competitors are so low relative to the initial cost of developing a
new commercial product (see Part I. B. 2., infra) that in the absence of patent protection, the prices set in
free markets would most likely be too low to cover the costs of development.51
I. B. 2. Cost of Innovation: Estimated R&D Expense per New
Chemical Entity
1. B. 2. a. Cost Drivers
Support for the argument that pharmaceutical innovation is exceptionally expensive can be found in the
academic literature. In a widely-publicized study, a team of researchers led by Joseph DiMasi at the Tufts
Center for the Study of Drug Development published their ﬁnding that the average cost of research and
development for a new chemical entity (including the costs of failed attempts) is 802 million dollars.52
DiMasi et al. collected data on R&D expenditures on a randomly selected sample of investigational drugs
that were developed entirely in-house from 10 pharmaceutical ﬁrms, including both U.S. and foreign-owned
companies.53 The ﬁrms themselves provided the R&D cost data. The drugs in the study did not receive
51Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, supra note 48, at
4.
52Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, and Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. Health Economics 151-185 (2003); But see Arnold S. Relman and Marcia Angell, America’s Other
Drug Problem, The New Republic, Dec. 16, 2002, at 28-30; and Public Citizen’s Congress Watch, America’s Other Drug
Problem: A Brieﬁng Book on the Rx Drug Debate, 2003, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/dbbapril.pdf.
53DiMasi, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, supra note 52, at 156.
16federal funding at any stage of development, and in this sense are arguably atypical.54 The cost estimate
therefore may overstates the R&D investment that the manufacturer itself needs to make in an average
case.55
The pharmaceutical industry is the beneﬁciary of substantial publicly-funded research. In a 1995 study by
MIT, the study authors found that publicly-funded research was a “critical contributor” to the discovery
of nearly all of the 25 most important drugs introduced between 1970 and 1995.56 Similarly, an National
Science Foundation study found that 50% of scientiﬁc research cited in drug and medicine patents was funded
by the federal government, while only 17% was funded by private industry.57 Technology transfer statutes,
including the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, permit private drug
manufacturers to seek patent rights on federally-funded research.58
In addition, it is important to note that the cost estimate applies only to new chemical entities, not all drug
products. New formulations and delivery methods are not taken into account, although they account for
about a third of R&D spending.59 An average cost which did include these products would substantially
drive down the cost estimate. It is important to note therefore, that DiMasi’s results do not reﬂect the
cost of an average new drug, but only those new drugs that contain an active ingredient that has not been
54Public Citizen’s Congress Watch, America’s Other Drug Problem: A Brieﬁng Book on the Rx Drug Debate, supra note 52,
at 48.
55But see DiMasi, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, supra note 52, at 56-57.
56Artie K. Rai, Symposium: Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century: The Information Revolution Reaches
Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 173, 185
fn. 53 (2001).
57Id., at 185 fn. 54.
58Id., at 185-86 fn. 56. The Bayh Dole Act was enacted to promote the commercialization of scientiﬁc discoveries made with
federal funding. 35 U.S.C. §200 (2006). It did so by authorizing private parties who engaged in federally-funded research to
retain title to their inventions, subject to reservation of a royalty-free nonexclusive license to the federal government. 35 U.S.C.
§202 (2006). See generally, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Symposium on Regulating Medical Innovation: Public Research and Private
Development: Patent and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663, 1665 (1996). The
Federal Technology Transfer Act authorized government laboratories to enter joint development agreements with industry and
to agree to assign patents on inventions made by federal employees to the private ﬁrm or its employees, subject to reservation
of a royalty-free license. 15 U.S.C. §3710 (2006). See generally, id. at 1706-1707.
59Pharmaceutical Investment and Output, Proceedings of the CMR International, 2002 (quoted in Richard G. Frank,
Editorial, New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. Health Economics, 325, 327 (2003)).
17approved for use in some other form.
The average cost calculated by DiMasi et al. does take into account the costs of the large proportion of
R&D eﬀorts that are unsuccessful by aggregating these costs with the costs of successful projects.60 Most
drug candidates which are initially investigated for use in humans will fail to reach market: less than 1% of
compounds in pre-clinical trials advance to clinical trials. Only about 20% of these gain FDA approval.61
Stated diﬀerently, of every 100 drugs for which investigational new applications are submitted to the FDA, 70
will successfully complete Phase 1 human trials. Thirty-three will complete Phase 2, 25 to 30 will complete
Phase III and 20 will be ultimately approved for sale.62 Thus, the revenues for successful drugs must be
suﬃcient to provide an incentive to pursue research that has a very high failure rate.
Although the $802 million ﬁgure is often cited as the “average cost of research and development,” the authors
of the study are careful to note that only about half of this ﬁgure, $403 million, represents the out-of-pocket
costs that the drug developer actually incurs. Clinical trial costs account for the largest portion of out-of-
pocket expenses.63 The other $399 million is the opportunity cost of investing in R&D rather than investing
in another activity with an 11% rate of return.64
Industry critics have challenged this cost estimate, arguing that the true cost of new chemical entity may be
as low as $100 million.65 They point out that the data relied upon by the DiMasi study is provided by the
pharmaceutical industry itself, which has a strong interest in justifying its pricing decisions, and no data is
publicly available to verify it.66 Thus, it is impossible to tell what expenses have been categorized by the
industry as “development” that are more appropriately categorized as marketing.67
60DiMasi, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, supra note 52, at 152-53.
61Joseph A. DiMasi, Success Rates for New Drugs Entering Clinical Testing in the United States, 58 Clinical Pharmacol-
ogy and Therapeutics 1-14 (1995).
62Michael S. Rosenwald, A Small Drug Firm’s Disappointment: After Failed Antibiotic Test, Advancis Aims to Regroup,
Washington Post, Jun. 17, 2005, at D1.
63DiMasi, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, supra note 52, at 165.
64Id., at 63.
65Relman, America’s Other Drug Problem, supra note 52, at 30.
66Id., at 29.
67Id.
18A subsequent study by Bain Consulting, based on 2000-2002 R&D spending data, estimated that the average
investment required to get a single drug to market has increased to $1.7 billion.68 Based on this number, Bain
contends that only one out of six new drug prospects will deliver returns above the industry’s risk-adjusted
cost of capital.69 The Bain press release does not mention for whom this study was commissioned but reads
as if designed to market Bain’s management consulting services to the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, it
seems possible that the study was designed to present the highest plausible estimate. This number is not
directly comparable to the DiMasi study, since it uses a substantially diﬀerent methodology, but academic
scholarship nonetheless supports the contention that the average cost of drug development is rising.70
While the DiMasi and Bain estimates are likely both inﬂated by marketing expenses, there is no doubt that
pharmaceutical research is both risky and extremely expensive. In addition, some historical data suggests
that investment will ﬂow elsewhere if prices decline substantially.71 These studies thus support the contention
that for at least some subset of drugs, and particularly for new chemical entities, the current patent and
regulatory protections are necessary to support continued innovation. They do not address, however, whether
these protections are also necessary for other subsets of drugs.
68Peter Landers, Cost of Developing a New Drug Increases to About $1.7 Billion, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 8, 2003.
69Has the Pharmaceutical Blockbuster Model Gone Bust?, Bain and Company Press Release, Dec. 8, 2003.
70Henry G. Grabowski, Are the Economics of Pharmaceutical Research and Development Changing? Productivity, Patents
and Political Pressures, 22 Pharmacoeconomics Suppl. 2: 15, 16 (2004). Among other things, the Bain study includes more
marketing expenses, such as commercialization costs, like preparing marketing materials. Landers, Cost of Developing a New
Drug Increases to About $1.7 Billion, supra note 68.
71In the wake of the President Clinton’s healthcare proposal, in which price controls were considered, investment in pharma-
ceutical research declined temporarily. Alan F. Holmer, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Letter, The
Pharmaceutical Industry – To Whom Is It Accountable, 343 New England J. Med. 1415 (2000).
19I. B. 2. b. How Much of Pharmaceutical Spending Is Marketing
or Proﬁt?
Subsidization of the private pharmaceutical industry through the patent and regulatory systems is justiﬁed
by the importance of promoting the advance and application of biomedical science. However, industry critics
argue that much of the activity that is subsidized is actually marketing and that the high proﬁt margins of
the industry suggest that current levels of subsidization are unnecessary. While there is strong public sup-
port for biomedical research, public subsidization of marketing expenses should be far more controversial,
and there is evidence that a substantial amount of pharmaceutical company spending is directed toward
marketing. The magnitude of marketing eﬀorts is substantial even relative to impressive R&D spending.
Public Citizen contends that Fortune 500 pharmaceutical ﬁrms spend more than three times as much on
marketing as they do on R&D.72 Likewise, the Wall Street Journal estimated that pharmaceutical companies
as a whole spend twice as much on marketing as they do on R&D.73 Industry observers contend that the
largest ﬁrms have shifted the core of their business away from the unpredictable task of creating drugs and
toward the less risky business of marketing them.74 AstraZeneca, for example, spent $478 million in 2001
to persuade consumers to move from Prilosec, which was coming oﬀ patent, to the nearly identical patented
drug, Nexium.75 Industry critic Marcia Angell notes, “the less important a new drug, the more marketing
is required to sell it.”76
Critics of the pharmaceutical industry also contend that consistently high proﬁt margins in the pharmaceu-
tical industry belie claims that the prices currently charged for drugs are necessary for the survival of the
72Public Citizen’s Congress Watch, America’s Other Drug Problem: A Brieﬁng Book on the Rx Drug Debate, 2003, supra
note 52, at 28.
73Gardiner Harris, New Script: Drug Firms, Stymied in the Lab, Become Marketing Machines, Wall Street Journal, Jul.
6, 2000, at A1.
74Id.
75See Harris, Drug Prices – Why They Keep Soaring, supra note 2.
76Marcia Angell, Letter, The Pharmaceutical Industry – To Whom Is It Accountable, 343 New England J. Med. 1417
(2000).
20industry and continued innovation.77 In the last several years, the pharmaceutical industry has consistently
ranked among the most proﬁtable industrial sectors by three measures of proﬁtability (see Table 2, infra).78
Arguably, measures of proﬁtability in research-based industries are complex enough to make cross-industry
comparisons misleading;79 and the pharmaceutical industry is the most research-intensive of U.S. industries
that support their R&D with private funds.80 Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the industry as a whole
earns a handsome return on its investment relative to other major industries despite a worrying downward
trend in the last few years.
Table 2: Pharmaceutical Industry Proﬁts
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77Henry Grabowski, John Vernon, and Joseph A. DiMasi, Returns on Research and Development for 1990s New Drug
Introductions, 20 Pharmacoeconomics Suppl. 3 11, 20 (2002).
78Fortune reports three measures of proﬁtability. Return on revenues (a.k.a. “proﬁt margin”) calculates net income as a
percent of revenues and gives the proﬁt per dollar of sales. A high proﬁt margin indicates that a company has ﬂexibility to
reduce its prices or absorb additional expense while remaining proﬁtable. Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total
assets. This indicates how much proﬁt is generated by each dollar of assets. Since assets are usually reported at historical cost
rather than fair market value, the total assets amount is usually very conservative and the ratio is artiﬁcially inﬂated. Return
on equity is equal net income as a percent of total equity. This ratio provides a measure of how much return stockholders
received from their investments. Since equity is diﬀerence between a company’s assets and its debt, return on equity measures
how eﬀectively management is using the owners’ investments to generate income. See Jeﬀrey H. Haas, Corporate Finance
in a Nutshell, 42-43 (2004).
79Uwe Reinhardt, Perspectives on the Pharmaceutical Industry, Health Affairs, Sep./Oct. 2001, at 142-43.
80F. M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry – Prices and Progress, 351 New England Journal of Medicine, Aug. 26,
2004, 927, 927 (2004).
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Theindustry,however,isheavilyreliantonsocalledblockbusterdrugs.StudiesbyGrabowski et al. show that the top 10% of
drugs accounted for close to half of the overall market value associated with all new drug introductions.82
Only the top 10% of new chemical entities (“NCEs”) have returns that far exceed the average R&D cost
($802 million) within the 71
2 year period of market exclusivity aﬀorded by the Hatch-Waxman provisions
(see Part I.C., infra for discussion of the Hatch-Waxman Act).83 Only 34% of NCEs have returns in excess
of the average R&D outlay. Accordingly, the top 10% of NCEs account for approximately half of all revenues
from new drugs. Although a drug whose revenues exceed variable costs (but not total costs) can contribute
positively to a ﬁrm’s bottom line, in the long run, a ﬁrm must have a number of products whose returns
signiﬁcantly exceed total R&D costs in order to have a viable R&D program.84 This suggests that reforms to
the regulatory structure which reduce returns to NCEs, absent other corrective measures, would signiﬁcantly
reduce incentives to produce them and diminish the proﬁtability of the industry as a whole.
81Fortune 500, Fortune, Apr. 18, 2005, at F-26, F-28; Fortune 500, Fortune, Apr. 5, 2004, at F-26, F-28.
82Grabowski, Returns on Research and Development for 1990s New Drug Introductions, supra note 77, at 11.
83Grabowski, Are the Economics of Pharmaceutical Research and Development Changing?, supra note 70, at 21. (7 1
2 year
period assumes that the brand name manufacturer will take advantage of the 30 month stay on generic approval.)
84Grabowski, Returns on Research and Development for 1990s New Drug Introductions, supra note 77, at 23.
22I. C. The Regulatory Framework
In addition to patent protection, the pharmaceutical industry is the beneﬁciary of federal regulations whose
eﬀect is to subsidize pharmaceutical innovation, and in particular, to enhance the proﬁtability of the block-
buster drugs. These regulations protect innovators against competition even after the original patent term
expires. They include the market exclusivity and patent term restoration provisions of the Hatch-Waxman
Act (discussed below), the Orphan Drug Act, and patent term extension for pediatric testing.
Drug manufacturers usually apply for a patent on a new drug after initial studies show that it may have
beneﬁcial biological activity, but before they complete the testing required for FDA approval.85 The average
remaining patent life for a drug after it obtains FDA approval is 11-12 years.86 Thus, the manufacturer
typically has 11-12 years to recover his investment, not the entire twenty-year term of the patent. The R&D
phase and the ﬁrst couple of years of marketing expenditures typically generate a stream of negative cash
ﬂows. Cash ﬂows then become positive for the rest of the patent term, and decline rapidly upon patent
expiration and the start of generic competition.87
In 1984, Congress reacted to growing concern that patent terms were not long enough to ensure cost re-
covery by passing the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly known as
“Hatch-Waxman.” The Hatch-Waxman Act has importantly shaped the nature of competition in the phar-
maceutical industry. Its provisions reﬂect the twin goals of encouraging innovation by ensuring market
exclusivity for sellers of newly-approved drugs, and encouraging generic competition for brand name drugs
whose patents and marketing exclusivity terms have expired.
Hatch-Waxman contains several provisions intended to increase generic competition for drugs that come
85Kuhlik, supra note 43, at 96-97.
86Joseph A. DiMasi and Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research and Development, 22 Phamacoeco-
nomics 1, 4 (2004).
87Grabowski, Returns on Research and Development for 1990s New Drug Introductions, supra note 77, at 20.
23oﬀ patent. First, it accelerates generic entry by allowing a streamlined approval process for generic drugs.
Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), a drug may not be marketed until the FDA approves its
New Drug Application (“NDA”).88 In order to obtain such approval, the applicant must submit data from
animal and human studies that demonstrate its safety and eﬃcacy. Prior to Hatch-Waxman, the innovating
manufacturer and manufacturer of a generic copy were subject to the same testing requirements for FDA
approval, and a generic manufacturer could not test its product during the patent term of the brand name
drug without infringing the patent.89 As a result, the generic manufacturer would have wait until the end
of the patent term of the branded drug and independently prove the safety and eﬀectiveness of its product.
Hatch-Waxman eliminated this unnecessary (and arguably unethical) clinical testing by establishing the
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) process for generic drug entry. Using the ANDA process,
generics manufacturers may rely on the data submitted with the NDA for the branded drug and need only
show bioequivalence to the branded product with the same active ingredient. Hatch-Waxman also creates a
safe harbor from infringement to allow generic companies to perform activities necessary to develop a generic
product, such as bioequivalence studies, during the term of the patent for the branded drug.90 Although the
testing required for an ANDA is signiﬁcantly less expensive than that required for an New Drug Application
(“NDA”), potential proﬁtability is also much lower due to competition from the original manufacturer and
other generic manufacturers.
As part of the ANDA, the generic manufacturer must certify whether the generic drug would infringe any
patents. A generic manufacturer can certify that there are no relevant patents, that the relevant patents
have expired, that the generic will not be marketed until after the relevant patent expires, or that the rele-
vant patent is invalid or not infringed by the generic (“paragraph IV certiﬁcation”). Patents that can serve
as the basis for certiﬁcation are found in the FDA’s list of “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
8821 U.S.C. §355(a) (2006).
89Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
9035 U.S.C. §271(e)(1)-(2) (2006).
24Equivalence,” a.k.a. “The Orange Book.”91 The FDA does not police what is listed in the Orange Book on
the grounds that it is not competent to judge the validity of patents.92 Hatch-Waxman provides an incen-
tive to challenge existing patents by granting a 180-day period of marketing exclusivity to the ﬁrst generic
manufacturer to challenge a patent and prevail.93 The 180-day period starts on the date of the court’s
determination that the patent is invalid or not infringed, or the marketing of the generic drug, whichever
comes ﬁrst. During the marketing exclusivity period, no other generic manufacturer may enter the market,
which allows the ﬁrst generic entrant to charge higher prices and establish a brand identity. The beneﬁt of
being ﬁrst-to-market has created a powerful incentive for generics to challenge patent validity in court, and
thus has led to extensive litigation.
These provisions of Hatch-Waxman substantially increased generic competition for oﬀ-patent drugs. Since
its enactment, generics’ market share has increased from 19% to 48%.94 Sales erosion for a product coming
oﬀ patent now often occurs in a matter of months.95 This increased availability of generics has had a sig-
niﬁcant impact on cost: a 1998 Congressional Budget Oﬃce (“CBO”) study showed that drugs which are
available in both generic and brand-name versions are approximately half of the average price of a brand-
name prescription. The CBO estimated that in 1994 alone the availability of generic drugs saved purchasers
an estimated $8 -10 billion.96
The Hatch-Waxman Act also has provisions intended to ensure that the inventors of new drugs can recoup
their R&D costs. First, it restores some of the patent term that is spent complying with FDA pre-marketing
9121 U.S.C. §355(b)(1) (2006).
92Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and
Policy, Chapter 3, at 13 (2003).
9321 USC §355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).
94Chris Adams and Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Face Battle to Preserve Patent Extensions — Governors Join Businesses,
Labor Unions in Eﬀort to Hasten Generics to Market, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 19, 2002, at A24.
95Grabowski, Are the Economics of Pharmaceutical Research and Development Changing?, supra note 70, at 19.
96Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, 9 (2002) (citing Congressional Budget
Oﬃce, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical
Industry (July 1998) at 28, available at <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index’655&sequence’0>).
25approval requirements. Patent term extensions give back one-half of the time spent in clinical trials plus the
time spent in the NDA approval process (between ﬁling and approval) up to a maximum of ﬁve years (or
fourteen years from the date of FDA approval).
Second, Hatch-Waxman grants limited periods of market exclusivity. The exclusivity provision operates by
barring generic manufacturers from relying on the brand name company’s safety and eﬀectiveness data in
the ANDA process. Five years of exclusivity are granted to each newly approved NCE regardless of patent
status. Three years are granted to modiﬁcations of a drug whose active ingredient has already been approved
by the FDA. (The value of the three-year marketing exclusivity period is limited, however, because doctors
can prescribe drugs oﬀ-label and a generic will not infringe a method-of-use patent as long as it does not
market the drug for the secondary indication for which exclusivity was granted.) An additional six months
of exclusivity is granted for pediatric testing.97
Furthermore, when a generic manufacturer undertakes a paragraph IV challenge to a patent, an automatic
30-month (two and a half year) stay on generic approval is triggered. This stay on generic approval is
triggered regardless of the likelihood that the generic manufacturer will win on the merits of the suit. As a
result, there is a 5-71
2 year ﬂoor on market exclusivity for an NCE after FDA approval.98 Under the original
legislation, a brand-name ﬁrm could generate multiple 30-month stays by listing multiple patents late in the
product’s life cycle. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 limited
each branded product to a single 30-month stay.99 Even without the availability of additional 30-month
9721 U.S.C. §355(a) (2006).
98Grabowski, Are the Economics of Pharmaceutical Research and Development Changing?, supra note 70, at 20-21.
99Pub. Law. 108-173, 117 Stat 2066, Dec. 8, 2003, Title XI—Access to Aﬀordable Pharmaceuticals (HR 1). This Amendment
to the bill was titled the “Greater Access to Aﬀordable Pharmaceuticals Act,” introduced in the Senate as S. 1225. June 10,
2003. See H. Res. 299 [Report No. 108-181]. Elimination of possibility of multiple 30 month stays: Medicare Act § 1101(2)(A),
codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
26stays, however, patents obtained after expiration of the original patent can still serve as the basis for an
ordinary patent infringement suit.100 Additional amendments to Hatch-Waxman restrict the availability of
a 30-month stay to patents listed with the FDA before the generic application was ﬁled and allow generic
companies to seek patent delisting from the Orange Book as a counterclaim in an infringement suit.101
I.D. Anti-Generic Strategies
I.D. 1. Non-Patent Based
The legal framework created by Hatch-Waxman and other regulatory provisions has created opportunities
for brand-name drug makers to develop strategies for keeping generics oﬀ the market.102 One strategy is to
develop a modiﬁed formulation, such as a drug containing the same active ingredient as a blockbuster drug,
which must be taken once a week instead of once a day. The modiﬁed version results in a three-year period
of marketing exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman provisions. In many states, the change prevents phar-
macists from automatically substituting a generic for the reformulation of the brand-name drug, since the
generic and the reformulated brand name drug are not exactly equivalent.103 For example, in Massachusetts,
state law requires pharmacists to substitute a generic drug (if available) for a brand name drug unless a
physician writes “no substitution.”104 This policy is intended to promote aﬀordable access to drug thera-
pies. Like some states, Massachusetts deﬁnes acceptable substitutes for a name brand drug largely based
100Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, supra note 96, at iv.
101Kuhlik, supra note 43, at 101.
102Adams, Drug Makers Face Battle to Preserve Patent Extensions, supra note 94.
103Gardiner Harris and Chris Adams, Delayed Reaction: Drug Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics —
That’s One Reason It Takes FDA Longer to Approve Knock-Oﬀs Than Brands — The `Metabolite Defense, ’Wall Street
Journal, Jul. 12, 2001, at A1.
104Division of Healthcare Finance and Policy, Healthpoint: What’s Driving Prescription Drug Costs, Apr. 1999, at 2,
available at http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/pdf/hp 13.pdf.
27on whether the FDA has designated the generic as a therapeutic equivalent of the prescribed drug.105 The
FDA, however, will not rate a generic as therapeutically equivalent to the original drug unless it has the same
dosage form and is bioequivalent.106 Thus, by developing multiple formulations of a drug, manufacturers can
evade regulatory schemes meant to increase use of generics. This provides an incentive for manufacturers
to aggressively promote switching patients to the new formulation of the drug before patent expiration on
the original.107 For example, to reduce generic competition for its blockbuster diabetes drug Glucophage,
Bristol Myers launched new formulations, including a version of Glucophage that can be taken once a day
instead of twice a day. Bristol-Myers used coupons to encourage patients to switch to the once-a-day version
for which it still had exclusive marketing rights.108 Most patients, of course, were unaware that they were
exchanging a drug that would soon have generic competition for one that would not.
Brand-name manufacturers also stave oﬀ generic competition by ﬁling citizen petitions that raise safety ob-
jections to ANDAs for generics.109 FDA regulations permit any citizen to raise safety concerns about a drug
the FDA is reviewing. Eighty percent of such objections are either rejected by the FDA or withdrawn by the
petitioner.110 The eﬀect of rejected petitions is to delay the entry of generics into the market. This is one
reason that the FDA takes longer to approve applications for generics, which should in theory be simpler,
than it takes to approve new drugs.111 FDA records show that in 2000, the median time for reviewing a
generic drug application was 18.2 months, whereas a new drug application took 11.2 months.112 In 2001,
Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and John McCain (R-AZ) introduced a bill to block such tactics. It would
105105 C.M.R. 720.050 (2006).
10644 FR 2932 (January, 12, 1979) (proposed rule) and 45 FR 72582 (October 31, 1980) (ﬁnal rule) (cited in The National
Institute for Health Care Management, Research and Educational Foundation, Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical
Innovation, May 2002, at 18 fn. 31).
107The National Institute for Health Care Management, Research and Educational Foundation, Changing Patterns
of Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 106, at 17-18.
108Harris, Bristol-Myers Lawyers Stymie Generics, supra note 1.
10921 C.F.R. §10.30 (2005).
110Harris, Delayed Reaction: Drug Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics, supra note 103; Adams, Drug
Makers Face Battle to Preserve Patent Extensions, supra note 94.
111Harris, Delayed Reaction: Drug Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics, supra note 103.
112Id.
28have required citizen-petitioners to better substantiate their challenges, and to prove they were not raising
questions for anticompetitive reasons. The bill, however, failed to reach a committee vote.113
Brand name companies also reach agreements with generics manufacturers in order to reduce competition.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) ﬁled numerous antitrust suits against brand name manufactur-
ers, alleging that they had paid generic manufacturers millions of dollars to delay or kill entry of generic
products.114 As of 2002, the FTC had challenged three settlement agreements between generic and brand
name manufacturers in which brand name manufacturers paid the generic applicant that had a 180-day
exclusivity under Hatch-Waxman not to enter the market, thereby ensuring that no generic would enter the
market for the exclusivity period.115 This practice was the subject of successful antitrust suits and Congress
recently prohibited it by enacting legislation mandating forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity, triggered by
events which indicate collusive agreement between ﬁrst-ﬁler generic and brand-name drug. However, brand
name manufacturers can still license a single generic drug during the patent term or produce its own generic
version of the drug.116 The presence of these “branded generics” reduces the value of the six-month exclusiv-
ity period for the ﬁrst paragraph IV challenge under Hatch-Waxman and thereby deters additional generic
competition after the patent term expires.117 Although the marketing of branded generics may mean that
a generic version reaches the market a few months sooner, it also means that a competitive market for the
original drug develops more slowly after patent expiration.
Brand name drug manufacturers have also prevented promising research by controlled entities when such
113Adams, Drug Makers Face Battle to Preserve Patent Extensions, supra note 94.
114Harris, Delayed Reaction: Drug Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics, supra note 103.
115Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, supra note 96, at vii.
116See e.g., Teva Pharm. Ind. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding FDA denial of generic maker Teva’s
request to prohibit the brand name company from marketing a generic version of its drug during Teva’s 180-day marketing
exclusivity period).
117These deals are known in the industry as “authorized generics.” Hollister H. Hovey, Big Pharma Courts Generics’ Rivals,
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 11, 2004, at 1; Leila Abboud, FDA Declines to Curb a Tactic of Drug Firms Against Generics,
Wall Street Journal, Jul. 6, 2004, at C3; Leila Abboud, Drug Makers Use New Tactic to Ding Generics, Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 27, 2004, at B1.
29research threatens to compete with another established or potential product.118 For instance, Tanox Inc.
terminated testing for a promising new peanut allergy medication, TNX-901, in response to pressure from
its business partner Genentech, which was developing a medication for the same indication (Xolair).119
Genentech sued to prevent Tanox from continuing clinical trials of TNX-901, citing the commercial threat
TNX-901 posed to Xolair, although Xolair was being tested for other indications, not peanut allergies. A
lawyer from Genentech argued, We really need to not have a competing product in the market from our
strategic partner.”120
I.D. 2. Patent-Based Anti-Generic Tactics (Evergreening)
Brand name manufacturers also have a variety of patent-based tactics for fending oﬀ generic competition.
During the 1990s, Schering-Plough poured millions of dollars into an unsuccessful lobbying eﬀort to win
special congressional approval for a patent extension for Claritin, arguing that delays at the FDA cost
Claritin years of sales.121 However, a far more common practice has been the use of strategies for maintaining
market share through the manipulation of existing patent law and its interaction with the Hatch-Waxman
Act. These practices are collectively known as “evergreening” because they have the eﬀect of extending the
patent term for a brand name drug. As one patent nears expiration, new patents on features of the drug issue
and delay generic competition further. Evergreening is typically accomplished by patenting modiﬁcations
of an already-patented product at the end of its patent life. Each new patent can be used as the basis of
118See e.g., David P. Hamilton, Silent Treatment: How Genentech, Novartis Stiﬂed A Promising Drug; Biotech Firm Tried
to Pursue Peanut-Allergy Injection, But Contract Got in Way; Zach Avoids a ’Kiss of Death’, Wall Street Journal, Apr.
5, 2005, at A1.
119Id.
120Id.
121Gardiner Harris, Leading the News: Schering-Plough Loses Defense Involving Claritin, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 9,
2002, at A3; Patent Fairness Act of 1999, H.R. 1598, 106th Cong. (proposing to extend patent for Claritin) (cited in Dan L.
Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1631, fn186, (2003)).
30a lawsuit against generic manufacturers, and its own patent extension and market exclusivity period under
Hatch-Waxman. In conjunction with market failures in pharmaceutical markets, this can mean that the
reward that a manufacturer derives from a modiﬁcation patent can far exceed its value to society.
The patent law provides some protection against this practice. In order to issue, a patent must be novel and
nonobvious.122 This means that a patent applicant is precluded from obtaining a patent on an invention
that has been patented previously or has been in public use, and from obtaining a patent on an obvious
modiﬁcation of a previously-patented drug (see “Prevention of Double Patenting,” Part III.B, infra). In the
absence of Hatch-Waxman, it is diﬃcult for a patent that is likely to be invalid for obviousness or lack of
novelty to retard competition, since the patent holder would have to convince a court to issue a preliminary
injunction against a competitor and would therefore have to be able to make a colorable claim that the patent
is valid. Hatch-Waxman, however, grants the patent holder an automatic 30-month (21
2 year) stay on the
approval of a generic that is not reviewed by a court. Thus, even a patent likely to be invalidated by a court
can signiﬁcantly delay generic entry.123 Prior to the 2003 Amendments to Hatch-Waxman, manufacturers
used multiple patent listings to generate successive 21
2 year stays on generic entry. This practice is no longer
possible, but listing multiple patents to protect a single brand name drug can still beneﬁt the manufacturer
by increasing the time and complexity of infringement litigation.124 Thus, the Hatch-Waxman mechanism
reverses the patent holder’s incentives in litigation. Whereas usually a patent holder would want to resolve
the legal issue of patent validity quickly so as to receive court-ordered remedies for infringement, under
Hatch-Waxman, the plaintiﬀ brand-name manufacturer beneﬁts from drawn-out litigation. Even a patent
which is likely to be declared invalid by a court and for which the plaintiﬀ will be awarded no damages relief
12215 U.S.C. §102, 103 (2006).
123Artie Rai, Symposium of Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Law, April 27, 2001 – Boston, Massachusetts: The
Proper Scope of IP Rights in the Post-Genomics Era, 8 B.U. J. Sci & Tech. L. 233, 238-39 (2002); but also see Federal
Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, supra note 96, at v. (The FTC is aware of a
few cases in which a 30-month stay was generated by a patent that raised legitimate questions about whether its listing was
appropriate).
124Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, supra note 96, at 40, 47. (data
showing that suits involving multiple patents take longer to resolve than those involving fewer patents).
31generates substantial value for its holder.
Given the incentives Hatch-Waxman produces, it is not surprising that the average number of patents
protecting brand-name drugs has increased from two to twelve over the past ten years, and the number of
patents for a particularly proﬁtable drug may far exceed this average.125
These patent- and non-patent-based strategies give brand name drug manufacturers many tools for reducing
competition and increasing revenues, such that the manufacturer’s exclusive hold on a market is extended
beyond the statutory period of the controlling patent. The question then for policy-makers is whether the
rewards that a patent confers, which may be extended at least in part well beyond the statutory term,
set the right balance between competition and public subsidization. The increase in rewards generated by
these strategies is easiest to justify for drugs whose social beneﬁts greatly exceed social costs (including
the costs associated with monopoly pricing); and indeed, availability of these strategies is arguably needed
to create incentives for important innovations. However, as discussed in Part II. A., infra, the availability
of these strategies also creates perverse incentives for the pharmaceutical industry that reward incremental
innovation far in excess of its net social value.
II. INCREMENTAL INNOVATION
II. A. The Case Against Incrementalism
While pharmaceutical manufacturers defend the revenues generated by new medications as reﬂecting the
value they provide to the public, critics of the industry argue that many of the newly-patented drugs are
125Gardiner Harris and Joanna Slater, Bitter Pills: Drug Makers See `Branded Generics’ Eating Into Proﬁts — Altered
Copies Outmaneuver Patents in Legal Battles, Boosting Market Pressures — Dr. Reddy’s Finds a Loophole, Wall Street
Journal, Apr. 7, 2003 at A1.
32insigniﬁcant improvements over products already on the market.126 Thanks to market failures, some of these
insigniﬁcantly improved drugs have become blockbusters, which generate billions of dollars in revenue. A
recent report by Blue Cross’s National Institute for Health Care Management Research and Educational
Foundation (“NIHCM”) concluded that there is a substantial disparity between spending and clinical value,
since a large increase in recent spending is attributable to product line extensions providing no signiﬁcant
clinical improvement over older medications.127
The arguments against incrementalism in pharmaceutical research are twofold: ﬁrst, the direction of resources
toward incremental innovation retards the development of break-through innovation by diverting resources
away from more ambitious projects; and second, it reduces access to needed medicines without signiﬁcantly
improving quality of care.
II. A. 1. Distortion of Incentives
Since it requires an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars to develop a marketable product, the
availability of large rewards for incremental innovations creates an economic incentive to divert resources
towards incremental improvements, since this increases the likelihood of realizing commercial beneﬁt. Mod-
iﬁcation of a drug whose safety and eﬃcacy are known is far less risky and expensive than developing a
completely new chemical entity. This combination of lower risk and high prices allowed by the combination
of patent protection, marketing exclusivity, faster FDA approval of new versions of already-marketed drugs,
and the price insensitivity of physicians and insured consumers combine to create powerful ﬁnancial incen-
126See e.g., Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What To Do About
It, 2004; Relman, America’s Other Drug Problem, supra note 52.
127The National Institute for Health Care Management, Research and Educational Foundation, Changing Patterns
of Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 106, at 19-20.
33tives for modest innovations.128 Under pressure from investors for annual revenue growth and facing patent
expirations for blockbuster drugs, pharmaceutical manufacturers no doubt face strong pressure to develop
commercially successful products as rapidly as possible. Dr. Sharon Levine, the associate executive director
and a pediatrician for the Kaiser Permanente Medical Group, speaking on ABC News framed the question
thus:
If I’m a manufacturer and I can change one molecule and get another 20 years of patent
rights, and convince physicians to prescribe and consumers to demand the next form of
Prilosec, or weekly Prozac, instead of daily Prozac, just as my patent expires, then why
would I be spending money on a lot less-certain endeavor, which is looking for brand-new
drugs?129
As evidence that incrementalism is becoming more common, critics of the industry point to the decreasing
number of NDAs issued for new chemical entities (“NCEs”). The FDA’s classiﬁcation of NDAs provides a
useful starting point for considering which pharmaceutical products are most valuable. The FDA classiﬁes
NDAs along two dimensions: chemical type and therapeutic potential.130 To classify by chemical type, the
FDA identiﬁes each NDA as falling into one of six categories. NCEs are compounds which have never been
approved for marketing in the U.S. Another four categories describe chemicals modiﬁcation of a drug whose
active ingredient is already on the market. These include new esters, salts or noncovalent derivatives, new
formulations, new combinations with other already marketed drugs, and new indications. NIHCM refers to
these categories collectively as “incrementally-modiﬁed drugs” (“IMDs).”131 The FDA also has categories for
applications for an already-marketed drug by a new manufacturer and for already-marketed drugs without
an approved NDA. NIHCM refers to these as “other drugs.”132
128Id., at 4.
130The National Institute for Health Care Management, Research and Educational Foundation, Changing Patterns
of Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 106, at 2.
131Id.
132This system of categorization is very similar to the NIHCM report; however, since they do not describe precisely which FDA
categories fall into “IMDs” and “Other,” this system may vary slightly. The number of drugs that fall into the “other” category
comprises a very small percentage of the total, so these results should be very close to those that the NIHCM methodology
would produce.
34The FDA also categorizes each NDA as either “standard review” or “priority review,” based largely on its
therapeutic potential. This classiﬁcation of NDAs is intended to enable the FDA to direct its resources
towards reviewing applications for drugs that show the greatest potential for therapeutic advance.133 Specif-
ically, the FDA assigns a drug to the priority review category if the drug manufacturer oﬀers evidence
of increased eﬀectiveness relative to products on the market, elimination or substantial reduction of side
eﬀects and interactions, enhanced patient compliance or use in a new subpopulation.134 All other NDAs
are classiﬁed as “standard.” The FDA policy states that to receive priority rating, the NDA must provide
evidence that it is a “signiﬁcant” improvement over drugs already on the market.135 Products that are rated
as “standard” then are generally products for which signiﬁcant improvement cannot be shown. Notably,
however, the purpose of the FDA rating structure is to allow it to prioritize its work, so the deﬁnition of
“priority” is not necessarily ﬁxed over time. Rather, the rating an NDA receives probably also reﬂects the
urgency of other concurrent submissions from the industry. If the industry submitted primarily NDAs for
drugs that were of little marginal beneﬁt relative to existing drugs and the FDA rated them all “standard,”
then the rating system would lose its value as a management tool.136
The NIHCM report Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, categorizes drugs according to their
degree of innovation based on the two FDA classiﬁcations. This classiﬁcation system is shown in Table 3, in-
fra. As a rough measure of innovation, these categories are useful for examining the trends in pharmaceutical
innovation that are revealed by FDA data.
Table 3: NIHCM Classiﬁcation by Degree of Innovation
Degree of
Innovation
Classiﬁcation Description
133Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, Manual of Policies and Procedures 6020.3, 1996, at 2.
134Id., at 1-2.
135Id., at 1.
136DiMasi, The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research and Development, supra note 86, at 8.
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Table 4, infra, illustrates trends in approvals over time. These data indicate that while drug approvals
increased during the 1990s, most of the growth was in standard IMDs (100 out of the additional 157 NDAs);
and that while total drug approvals have declined in recent years, approvals of IMDs have remained steady.
Furthermore, priority NCEs account for only 11% of newly approved drugs, but they account for nearly half
of the total decline in approvals.
Table 4: Trends in NDA Approval by Degree of Innovation137
137Data are from Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, NDAs Approved in Calendar Years 1990-2004 by Therapeutic
Potential and Chemical Type, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/pstable.htm. Also see NIHCM for analysis of trends
381990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Priority
NCEs
as
%
of
NDAs
14% 18% 11%
Total Priority NCEs 90 117 80
%
Change
+30% (32%)
Standard
IMDs
as
%
of
NDAs
39% 49% 58%
Total Standard IMDs 139 249 247
% Change +78% (1%)
Total NDA
Approvals
350 507 427
% Change +45% (16%)
Other data support the apparent slowdown in pharmaceutical innovation.138 The New York Times recently
reported that despite record investment in R&D by the pharmaceutical industry, new drug approvals by
the FDA declined in 2005 relative to 2004. 139 Some observers argue that the pharmaceutical industry has
responded to the ﬁnancial incentives inherent in the current regulatory framework by focusing more of their
eﬀorts on incremental innovation.140 In addition, there is evidence that identifying break-through drugs has
in 1989-2000 data. The National Institute for Health Care Management, Research and Educational Foundation,
Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 106.
138The current slowdown is not a new phenomenon, however. In the 1970s, industry observers expressed concern about the
declining levels of new introductions and speculated that the industry had entered a mature phase with diminished opportunities
for innovation. This concern provided some of the impetus for the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984. In 1982, former FDA Chief
Counsel Peter Barton Hutt testiﬁed on behalf of PhRMA that the pace of innovation was declining and that enhanced patent
protection was necessary to spur increased investment in R&D. Peter B. Hutt, The Importance of Patent Term Restoration to
Pharmaceutical Innovation, Health Affairs, Spring 6 (1984).
139Alex Berenson, Drugs in ’05: Much Promise, Little Payoﬀ, New York Times, Jan. 11. 2006, at C1.
140Relman, America’s Other Drug Problem, supra note 52, at 30-33.
39become more technically diﬃcult in recent years. The proportion of drugs investigated that eventually reach
the market shows a downward trend. Bain Consulting found that the number of drugs that enter animal
testing which subsequently make it to market has declined from 1 in 8 in the 1995-2000 period to 1 in 11 in
the 2000-2002 period.141 Thus, the trend toward incremental innovation may be exacerbated by technical
challenges that reinforce regulatory incentives for incrementalism.
Alternative theories as to the causes of the recent slowdown abound. Some industry analysts argue that
the revolution in genetic engineering is slowing drug development, as companies need time to develop so
many complicated new tools.142 Others blame organizational structures in large companies that impede
innovation. 143 For example, The New York Times reported that Glaxosmithkline’s labs were “virtually
paralyzed by a post-merger reorganization.”144 Pharmaceutical mergers have resulted in larger companies
that may be less willing to take risks. As a result of mergers, projects may be stopped, not for lack of merit,
but because they are too small (in terms of potential market) or do not ﬁt within the merged company’s
business strategy.
Although the pharmaceutical industry has expressed considerable concern that price controls would cripple
innovation, no signiﬁcant price controls have materialized yet, and the current slowdown has not been
attributed to downward pressure on prices.
These trends towards incrementalism are concerning to the extent that they suggest that more innovative
research is being crowded out. The FDA data do not reveal the reasons that the rate of break-through
141Landers, Cost of Developing a New Drug Increases to About $1.7 Billion, supra note 68.
142“Looking forward, the drug industry is currently confronted with a new wave of technological opportunities. The mapping
of the genome and related advances in ﬁelds such as bioinformatics have led to an abundance of potential new targets for
disease intervention.... A recent report by Lehman Brothers foresees a negative impact on returns until at least the latter part
of this decade, when the substantial required buildup in R&D investments should begin to bear fruit.” Grabowski, Returns on
Research and Development for 1990s New Drug Introductions, supra note 77, at 26.
143Mallorye Branca, Genomics Provides the Kick Inside, Bio IT-World, available at http://www.bio-
itworld.com/archive/111403/horizons kick.html.
144Id.
40innovation has declined recently, but they are at least consistent with the hypothesis that market failures
and current regulatory structures create greater incentives for incremental research than for more innovative
eﬀorts.
II. A.2. Consumer Access Limited by Pricing
Incremental improvements are also concerning to the extent that they increase social costs in excess of
their social beneﬁts. While precise cost-beneﬁt analyses are prohibitively complex, it is at least clear that
incremental improvements are substantial cost drivers. New standard-rated drugs accounted for $29.3 billion
in increased drug spending from 1995-2000 and 67% of the total increase in spending.145 Although the
existence of substitutes for a drug should theoretically drive prices down, the moral hazard associated with
insurance and marketing by manufacturers may increase the patient population for a particular drug above
eﬃcient levels and prevent customers from migrating to the most cost-eﬀective option.146 Insured patients
typically do not face the entire price of the drug they are receiving and thus do not face a strong incentive
to shop for the lowest-cost option. Accordingly, incremental innovations usually do not result in signiﬁcant
reductions in the price of pioneer drugs, because they are imperfect substitutes, and insured patients and
doctors who are insensitive to price tend not to respond to imperfect substitution.147 Moreover, patients
who are price insensitive are highly susceptible to advertising.148 This allows drug manufacturers to make
tremendous proﬁts from drugs that are true improvements only for a small subset of patients. Thus, though
an IMD may provide a marginal net beneﬁt for a small proportion of patients, the total marginal beneﬁt
145The National Institute for Health Care Management, Research and Educational Foundation, Changing Pat-
terns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 106, at 11.
146See Swidey, The Costly Case of the Purple Pill, supra note 8.
147Rai, Symposium: Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century: The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceu-
ticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, supra note 56, at 206.
148Id.
41is likely to be small relative to the total marginal cost, particularly when the new drug addresses illnesses
whose symptoms are fairly mild, like allergies.149
II. B. The Case for Incrementalism
Some industry observers argue that incremental innovations are socially valuable and that patent law should
encourage them. Advocates for strong patent protection of incremental innovations make three major ar-
guments in favor of them. First, they argue that the class of incremental innovations which are commonly
derided as “me-too” drugs are in fact important technical advances, which produce both medical and eco-
nomic beneﬁts. “Me too” drugs were ﬁrst identiﬁed as a problem in the U.S. Senate (“Kefauver”) hearings
in the late ‘50s and early ‘60s. A “me too” drug is a new drug entity with a similar chemical structure
or the same mechanism of action as that of a drug already on the market. Often, it is a new member of
a therapeutic class of drugs that has been identiﬁed by another drug entity that was ﬁrst in its class, the
“pioneer” drug.150 “Me too” drugs are less controversially known as “follow-on” drugs.
Studies by DiMasi and Paquette challenge the assertion that the pioneer drug is usually the best in its
therapeutic class. Fifty-seven percent of all therapeutic classes have at least one follow-on drug that received
a priority rating. The pattern of innovation DiMasi and Paquette uncovered suggests a development race
for drugs in a new therapeutic class, rather than a scenario in which ﬁrms engage in low-risk imitation of
a proven break-through.151 Nearly all follow-on drugs for classes where a pioneer drug was approved in the
1990s were in clinical trials before the pioneer drug was approved.152 Thus, DiMasi and Paquette conclude
149Id., at 205-6.
150DiMasi, The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research and Development, supra note 86, at 2.
151Id., at 10.
152Id., at 9.
42that
[t]he prevailing drug development paradigm is one in which a number of ﬁrms will pursue
investigational drugs with similar chemical structures or the same mechanism of action
before any drug in the class obtains regulatory marketing approval.... Thus, the typical
drug development model is one in which ﬁrms are, in eﬀect, engaged in development races,
as opposed to one that is characterized by after-the-fact imitation.153
Furthermore, they argue that the discovery of multiple drugs in the same class is beneﬁcial because they
diﬀer in their side eﬀects, average eﬃcacy, eﬃcacy in particular individuals, adverse reactions, drug-drug
interactions, dosing schedules and delivery systems.154 DiMasi and Paquette’s research also indicates that
the presence of multiple drugs in a therapeutic class introduces some price competition.155
Advocates of strong patent protection also contend that even drugs that are not shown to be safer or
more eﬃcacious than already-marketed drugs have important health beneﬁts. In testimony before the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology, Peter
Hutt argued on behalf of PhRMA that drugs that are no better on average than those already on the market
nevertheless provide substantial value to patients:
Whoever argues that a drug oﬀers little or no therapeutic advantage is talking about an
average over millions of people, not about a single patient. A drug that seems to oﬀer little
therapeutic advantage to the entire population may well be, and often is, the only drug
that oﬀers any therapeutic beneﬁt to a small subpopulation. And if you happen to be one
of the individuals in that subpopulation, that particular drug has an enormous therapeutic
advantage, rather than the small therapeutic advantage attributed to it by others. Indeed,
for you it is the only important drug. Classiﬁcation of a drug as important or unimportant
is therefore arbitrary and ignores the speciﬁc needs of individual patients... the availability
of a wide variety of drugs for any particular disease is... vital to the public health.156
The beneﬁt of having a variety of medications available for a particular indication, however, is limited by the
amount of data available to physicians about the relative advantages of a drug for certain subpopulations.
While it is certainly true that a drug which is less eﬀective for the general population may be better for
154Id., at 11.
155Id., at 12. But see Rai, Symposium: Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century: The Information Revolution
Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, supra note 56, at 206.
43particular individuals, drug manufacturers are not required during the patent application process or the
FDA approval process to provide the public with any information about who those individuals might be.
A third important argument for encouraging incrementalism stems from the nature of biomedical research.
Technological advances in biomedical research are more commonly achieved through a series of incremental
steps rather than isolated break-throughs.157 If all advance is incremental and break-throughs are usually
random results of incremental research, then policies should be designed to promote a large population
of incremental research projects from which a break-through innovation may emerge. Furthermore, the
prospect of follow-on incremental products may provide necessary incentives for break-through innovation if
the current patent term is not an adequate reward itself for break-through innovation.
II. C. Categories of Incrementalism
The extraordinary proﬁtability of drugs like Nexium, which are not signiﬁcant improvements over less ex-
pensive drugs already on the market, suggests that current patent and regulatory law rewards incremental
improvements far in excess of their actual value to society. Concomitantly, data showing the extraordinary
cost of break-through innovation suggests that rewards for it may be too low. This mismatch of beneﬁt and
reward should be of particular concern for the development of patent law, given that the justiﬁcations for
the award of patents are fundamentally utilitarian. The background assumption in American patent law is
that free competition generates the greatest social good, and that exceptions should be made to this rule
only where the beneﬁts of limiting competition exceed costs. Labor and desert theories of property law play
only a secondary role in justifying patent law. The primary goal of the patent law is not to reward inventors
157Albert Wertheimer, Thomas W. O’Connor, Jr., and Richard Levy, The Value of Pharmaceutical Innovation for Older
Americans 3 (2001) available at http://www.npcnow.org/resources/PDFs/valueincremental pharm olderamericans.pdf.
44with what they deserve as a matter of natural right. Indeed, Thomas Jeﬀerson, one of the early drafters of
American patent law, argued that “[s]ociety may give an exclusive right to the proﬁts arising from them,
as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done
according to the convenience of society...”158 Since the goal of patent law is to encourage societal goals,
patent policy should be tailored to achieve these goals.
As a preliminary step in analyzing the eﬀectiveness of the current patent regime in promoting innovation, it
is important to consider what kinds of innovations should be considered valuable to society and which are
less valuable; and then to consider whether the patent law under-incentivizes the most valuable innovations
and/or over-incentivizes the least valuable.
Clearly, the main rationale for the subsidization of the pharmaceutical industry through the patent system
is to produce health beneﬁts, so the extent to which a drug improves health should be one measure of its
value.The degree to which such improvements are realized will necessarily depend not only on the properties
of the drug itself but on the amount of information which researchers provide to locate the population for
whom it provides a health beneﬁt. A drug may have the same eﬀect as an already-marketed drug in most
people, but be signiﬁcantly better for a subpopulation with a particular genetic or biochemical proﬁle. To
the degree that this subpopulation is identiﬁed in clinical trials, physicians are able to eﬃciently target those
medications to the population for whom they are eﬀective, instead of proceeding by an ineﬃcient process
of trial and error with each patient. Any classiﬁcation of social beneﬁt then must take into account not
only improved properties of drugs, but also enhancements in the knowledge available for physician decision-
making.
A one-dimensional scale that takes into account both factors (product properties and knowledge) is diﬃcult
to construct with precision. I have attempted to develop a scale that roughly prioritizes the social beneﬁt of
158Thomas Jeﬀerson, Letter to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 18, 1813 (cited in Robert P. Merges and Jane C. Ginsburg,
Foundations of Intellectual Property Law, 2004, at 19).
45both types of improvement, but it is necessarily imprecise. Table 6, infra, shows a possible ordering of gen-
eral categories of innovations. For the sake of simplicity, this scale does not diﬀerentiate between drugs used
to treat serious versus less serious disease or common versus rare disease, although these are also important
considerations.
Another useful measure is the diﬃculty of discovery, as this would be a rough indicator of the degree of in-
centive that the patent system needs to provide beyond market incentives. The nonobviousness requirement
of patent law itself suggests a framework for analyzing diﬃculty of discovery. Under the patent statute, no
patent may issue if “the diﬀerences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”159 Even an invention that is
novel in the literal sense of the term, is not patentable if “its contours are so traced by the existing technology
in the ﬁeld that the ‘improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.’160 Thus, the
nonobviousness standard tries to measure the degree of technical advance over already-existing inventions
to determine whether it is worth rewarding with patent protection.
In the context of chemical inventions, the Federal Circuit has rejected a potential deﬁnition of obviousness
that encompasses inventions that result from an “obvious approach to try.” 161 A chemical product is not
rendered obvious merely because the prior art suggests that it might be a logical target for investigation
as a drug. An investigation of a chemical that is “obvious to try” might involve substantial risk of failure,
and therefore require incentives to encourage in the absence of any expectation of success. Under current
doctrine, the absence of “reasonable expectation of success” is an indicator of nonobviousness. Thus, an ob-
vious result is needed to render the invention obvious. The nonobviousness analysis considers “(1) whether
15935 U.S.C. §103 (2006).
160Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 149-50 (1989) (quoting Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248, 267
(1851).
161See e.g., In re Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (PTO failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness since
at best “one skilled in the art might ﬁnd it obvious to try various combinations of these known” elements).
46the prior art would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art that they should make the claimed
[invention]; and (2) whether the prior art would have suggested to those or ordinary skill in the art that in
so making... those of ordinary skill would have a reasonable expectation of success.”162
This diﬀerentiation of innovations in case law into “obvious to try” and “obvious result” suggests one way of
characterizing the degree of innovation. One might classify a new drug as either innovative, obvious to try
(such as additional members of a therapeutic class), or an obvious result that the average pharmaceutical
researcher could foresee (such as applying a well-known delivery method to a known drug). The degree of
innovation required would then suggest whether such discoveries are appropriate targets for the incentives
provided by patents. However, the degree of innovation and degree of social beneﬁt should not be conﬂated.
Some signiﬁcant innovation results from ideas that are “obvious to try” (e.g. a puriﬁed stereoisomer that
works better than its racemate), but new compounds that provide little social beneﬁt also result from ideas
that are “obvious to try” (e.g., Nexium). Thus, whether something is “obvious to try” does not indicate
whether the invention is socially beneﬁcial.
The resulting classiﬁcation system is summarized in Table 5, infra, and a possible classiﬁcation of types of
drug discovery using this system is illustrated in more detail in Table 6, infra.163
Table 5: Classiﬁcation of Drugs by Social Beneﬁt and Inventiveness
Net Social Beneﬁt
162In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
163The category labeled “innovative” corresponds with the colloquial meaning of “not obvious” but I have avoided that term
here so as not to confuse it with its more speciﬁc meaning in the context of patent law.
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52Greatest Net Social Beneﬁt
The justiﬁcation for patent protection is strongest for those drugs that fall into the category of greatest
social beneﬁt and greatest degree of innovation. In this category of inventions, the paradigmatic cases are
new chemical entities that establish a new therapeutic class, new and unexpected uses for known drugs, and
combinations of known drugs that yield unexpected therapeutic eﬀects. For example, ﬂuoxetine (Prozac),
the ﬁrst marketed selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor, and omeprazole (Prilosec), the ﬁrst proton pump
inhibitor, would fall into this category. These drugs were revolutionary advances over existing therapies and
suggested future direction for fruitful investigation. Investigation of compounds that are structurally similar
to the pioneers in a therapeutic class can be classiﬁed as “obvious to try” but since the biological activity
of compounds is not easily predicted from structure, they are not obvious to succeed. As discussed in Part
II.B., supra, though less purely innovative, later-discovered compounds in a known therapeutic class may be
safer and more eﬀective than the pioneer drug.
An unexpected use of a known drug or a combination of known drugs that yields unexpected results would
include only inventions whose eﬃcacy did not seem all but certain given the state of knowledge about its uses
at the time of invention. This would therefore likely require signiﬁcant inventive eﬀort and costly research
to identify.
Some inventions may produce great social beneﬁt through increased eﬃcacy, but require little inventive
eﬀort. This category of invention includes the discovery of new and expected uses for known drugs. In these
cases, the biological mechanism of related diseases may be so closely related that the successful application
of a known drug to the new indication would be an obvious result, but nonetheless provide substantial social
beneﬁt.
The category of inventions with the greatest social value but the least innovation also includes those in
53which real increases in eﬃcacy are achieved by applying well-understood technologies in new contexts so
as to achieve a predictable result. For example, AstraZeneca received a patent for putting two coatings on
the active ingredient of Prilosec.164 Prilosec’s active ingredient does not survive long, and so it needs to
be coated so the active ingredient lasts long enough to be absorbed into the intestine. This problem is so
common that the problem and its solution are described in standard industry textbooks.165 If this is the
case, there is arguably no need to oﬀer patent protection for the application of known coating methods to a
known drug, since there are suﬃcient market incentives for manufacturers to apply existing technologies to
ensure that their pills are eﬀective.
Substantial Net Social Beneﬁt
Other pharmaceutical developments that generate important social beneﬁts include 1) studies that increase
knowledge of safety and eﬃcacy, 2) modiﬁcations of existing drugs which improve over prior drugs by ex-
hibiting lower rates of unwanted eﬀects, 3) drugs which are improvements over prior drugs in terms of safety
and eﬃcacy for a known subpopulation, and 4) improvements to drugs that increase patient comfort and
convenience.
Studies that increase knowledge of safety or eﬃcacy would provide support to approved and oﬀ-label uses.
Such studies would not produce patentable products or uses, since they would likely fail the requirement
of novelty. However, they nonetheless produce important social beneﬁts in the form of knowledge to guide
patient and physician decision-making.
New drugs that improve over existing drugs by reducing side eﬀects can also generate important social bene-
ﬁts. This would include new formulations of known active ingredients with chemicals that reduce degradation
164Harris, Drug Prices – Why They Keep Soaring, supra note 2.
165Id.
54and toxicity and changes to the compound that allow for less frequent administration or a less invasive route
of administration. For example, the maker of best-selling drug Epogen chemically modiﬁed it, so that it
would have a longer half-life and thus require less frequent administration.166
Another important and controversial category of improvements that potentially falls into this category is
the development of puriﬁed stereoisomers. The formation of stereoisomers occurs in about half of all drug
compounds.167 They are mirror image forms of the same chemical compound. They have identical chem-
ical formulas and connectivity between atoms, but diﬀer in their three-dimensional structures. Although
stereoisomers have identical physical properties (other than optical activity), they have unique biological
eﬀects, since many biochemical reactions depend on a lock-and-key interaction that is dependent on three-
dimensional structure.168 Since many biochemical reactions use a particular three-dimensional form of a
drug, but not its stereoisomer, the two or more stereoisomers of a compound may have profoundly diﬀerent
eﬀects on biological systems. In some cases, one stereoisomer has a therapeutic eﬀect, while the other is
toxic. Given these important diﬀerences, a puriﬁed active stereoisomer may be a signiﬁcant improvement
over a drug that was originally produced as a mixture of stereoisomers (also known as a “racemate” or
“racemic” mixture).169
Stereochemistry has been known since Louis Pasteur identiﬁed the phenomenon in the 19th century and its
eﬀects on the biochemical activity of pharmaceuticals has been well-understood for decades. In the 1990s,
economical methods of developing pure stereoisomers became widely available.170 Thus, improving a known
166Medical Oﬃcer Clinical Review, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, Aranesp Med-
ical Review. Clinical Review of BLA 99-1492/ STN103951, Sept. 5, 2001 at 6, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/biologics/review/ARANESP Med Oﬃcer Review.pdf.
167Michael Strong, FDA Policy and Regulation of Stereoisomers: Paradigm Shift and the Future of Safer, More Eﬀective
Drugs, 54 Food Drug L. J. 463, 467 (1999).
168FDA, FDA’s Policy Statement for the Development of New Stereoisomeric Drugs, May 1, 1992, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/stereo.htm. Physical properties include melting point, boiling point and density. Biological
properties refer to the molecules’ interaction with chemicals in living organisms.
169Strong, FDA Policy and Regulation of Stereoisomers, supra note 167, at 470-71; Steven C. Carlson, The Case Against
Market Exclusivity for Puriﬁed Enantiomers of Approved Drugs, 1 Yale Symp. L. & Tech. 6 (1999) (see Seldane example).
170Strong, FDA Policy and Regulation of Stereoisomers, supra note 167, at 467-68.
55drug by identifying the stereoisomer which produces its therapeutic eﬀects is “obvious to try,” but the bi-
ological activity of an isolated stereoisomer is not predictable from information about the mixture.171 To
the extent that researchers show that a puriﬁed stereoisomer is more eﬀective and safe than the mixture of
stereoisomers, such studies yield important social beneﬁts. Even in cases in which the puriﬁed stereoisomer
shows no improvements in overall safety and eﬃcacy relative to a mixture, it is possible that the puriﬁed
form will be safer or more eﬀective in a particular subpopulation of patients. In such cases, the production
of the clinical trial data to identify such a population (through the use of head-to-head trials against the
mixture) is itself beneﬁcial. Puriﬁed stereoisomers would then seem to fall into the category of “obvious to
try” but not “obvious result.”
Some inventions which oﬀer signiﬁcant social beneﬁt, however, are an “obvious result” of uses of prior art.
These inventions include combinations of known ingredients that yield expected results. For example, when
outside researchers discovered that ulcers were often the result of bacterial infection, AstraZeneca patented
the combination of its already-patented drug Prilosec with antibiotics. Combining the two medications in a
single pill arguably increases patient convenience, but if the combination yields the same therapeutic results
as the two compounds administered separately, then the inventive eﬀort required is minimal.
Another such category of inventions involves the application of well-known routes and methods of adminis-
tration to known drugs. For example, technologies to allow extended release versions of known drugs can
generate important beneﬁts to patients who prefer fewer administrations and may experience fewer side
eﬀects. Extended release drugs, for instance, which reduce alcohol dependence or mental illness may help
patients achieve signiﬁcantly better compliance than a daily dose medication, since a weekly or monthly
dose does not give the patient a daily chance to change his mind about his therapy.172 However, the tech-
nologies needed to produce this eﬀect may not be innovative. They may involve merely the application of a
171Id., at 472.
172See e.g. Rachel Zimmerman, New Ways to Take Old Drugs Help Patients, Extend Patents, Wall Street Journal, Mar.
15, 2004, at B1.
56well-known technology to the known compound.
Low Net Social Beneﬁt
Inventions that arguably provide lower beneﬁt than those discussed above include 1) potential for improved
safety/eﬃcacy for unknown subpopulation, and 2) increased knowledge of safety or eﬃcacy for a known
subpopulation. Some social beneﬁt is derived from studies that identify speciﬁc beneﬁts to a subset of a
population in which a drug is already known to be safe and eﬀective. For example, Aventis patented its
anti-allergen Allegra and later attempted to patent a method for using Allegra as an anti-allergen for patients
with impaired liver function. They revealed no new use for the medication, nor was their any change to its
chemical formulation. The research they submitted was valuable for what it revealed about the safety of the
drug in a particular subpopulation, but did not reveal any new uses for the drug.173
Some inventions of puriﬁed stereoisomers also produce only minimal social beneﬁt. Pharmaceutical manu-
facturers have patented puriﬁed stereoisomers even when the puriﬁed stereoisomer shows no improvement
over the mixture of stereosiomers. This is the case for best-selling drugs Nexium (a puriﬁed stereoisomer of
Prilosec) and Lexapro (a puriﬁed stereoisomer of Celexa). Although the puriﬁed version does give another
option to doctors to use for individual patients who do not react well to the mixture, if no comparative
studies are done (none are required for FDA approval), then the inventor has not provided doctors with any
information to aid in determining which drug is better for any particular individual. Thus, the availability
of these drugs expands the number of options, but they are not necessarily targeted to the patients who
would beneﬁt most from them.
The development of puriﬁed versions of metabolites of already-marketed drugs is also of low beneﬁt. A
173Aventis Pharms Inc. v. Barr Labs, LEXIS 3355, 93 (D.C.N.J. 2006).
57metabolite is the chemical product of reactions involving the active ingredient of a drug that take place in
the human body, and is the compound that ultimately produces the therapeutic eﬀect (as opposed to the
active ingredient in the original drug). Some pharmaceutical companies have developed drugs that consist
of the metabolite of a drug already on the market. Some of these metabolites may oﬀer modest beneﬁts over
their parent compound, such as a longer half life that allows less frequent administration.174 Others may
provide no average improvement, but provide a beneﬁt to an unknown subpopulation. The metabolite usu-
ally produces therapeutic results that are obvious given what is already known about the parent compound.
The technical process required to isolate it may not be obvious, so a synthesized metabolite may be only
obvious to try, whereas the naturally-produced metabolite would be an obvious result.175
Insigniﬁcant Net Social Beneﬁt
Drug manufacturers have also tried to patent new uses for already-marketed drugs for which it submits no
new NDA. If the manufacturer does not provide signiﬁcant new research to support the eﬃcacy and safety
of the drug, its contribution is minimal. For instance, Warner-Lambert patented gabapentin (Neurontin)
and patented its use in epilepsy and neurodegenerative disorders. It obtained FDA approval only for use
in epilepsy; it did not obtain approval for neurodegenerative disorders. After the product and epilepsy use
patents expired, it tried to use the neurodegenerative disorder use patent to bar generic manufacturers from
making gabapetin on the grounds that they would induce infringement of its neurodegenerative disorders
use patent. This argument was rejected by the Federal Circuit, but nonetheless allowed Warner-Lambert
174See e.g., Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, Medical Officer Review, NDA 21-165, (2001), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/nda/2001/21-165 Clarinex medr P1.pdf.
175In Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms, Inc., the Federal Circuit invalidated claims for a metabolite of Claritin produced in
the human body as inherently anticipated by the patent for Claritin. However, it advised that a metabolite can be patented in
its pure and isolated form. 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
58to obtain a 30-month stay on generic entry.176 This suggests that patents of new uses which are not then
followed-up with research to develop and commercialize the use may even have a negative social value.
Although the patent will later be held invalid, the patent owner can, without adding anything new to public
knowledge, use a patent which will ultimately be found invalid to delay generic entry and maintain monopoly
prices beyond the statutory term of an earlier valid patent.
Implications
As the categories described above emphasize, there is no necessary correlation between the degree of in-
novation and social beneﬁt to be derived from an invention. Nor given pervasive market failures is there
strong correlation between the social beneﬁt of an invention and the rewards reaped by a patent holder. The
current regulatory structure thus does not consistently provide the least incentive to low-innovation/low-
beneﬁt drugs, or the most incentive to high-beneﬁt/high-innovation drugs. One could imagine addressing
this problem by implementing policies which more closely tailor the royalties to be derived from patents to
the social beneﬁt the underlying invention produces, and by increasing the standards for patent issuance.
The next section explores these possibilities.
III. POLICY LEVERS TO REDUCE INCREMENTALISM
The categories of innovation described in Part II, and the economic and legal context described in Part I,
suggest that there are at least two types of errors that lead to under- or over-rewarding innovation in the
176Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed Cir. 2003).
59pharmaceutical industry. First, the combination of market failures and the low bar for nonobviousness in
patent law allows some number of drugs to reap revenues that are far in excess of their beneﬁt. Conversely, in
the absence of mechanisms that over-reward follow-on innovations, inadequate incentives may exist for some
types of valuable innovation. In other words, manufacturers may not reap adequate returns on their invest-
ments in break-through drugs without the additional revenues currently available from follow-on innovation.
In order to address this failure, policy-makers need to increase the availability of information available to
physicians and patients, so that they can make informed choices about pharmaceutical products. This would
likely require a system of mandatory provision of comparative data from independent researchers and gov-
ernment funding for such trials. It might also need to include additional incentives for innovation, possibly
in the form of modiﬁcations to the marketing exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Second, the interaction of patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act and other regulatory requirements makes
weak patents very valuable to their owners. The importance of preventing the issuance of weak patents in
this context means that it is especially important to consider methods of reducing such errors, including
revisions to the standards for patentability, improvements to the patent application process, and penalties
for double patenting.
III. A. Mis-valued Innovation
The standard account of pharmaceutical innovation argues that pharmaceuticals require strong patent protec-
tion because the cost of innovation is exorbitant, whereas the cost of reverse engineering and manufacturing
the chemical product is relatively trivial. So, in order to spur continued investment and innovation, the
inventor must be given legal assurance that he will be able to appropriate the full value of his invention. The
60absence of comparative data about drug eﬀectiveness and safety in conjunction with other market failures,
however, has created a system in which patent rewards are poorly tailored to the value of pharmaceutical
inventions. One part of the strategy to make patent rewards proportional to the beneﬁt provided by a
new drug product should be to increase the payoﬀ for identifying subpopulations for whom drugs are more
eﬀective and decrease the payoﬀ for failing to provide such information.
The current state of drug regulation allows manufacturers to market new drugs without having to prove
that they are improvements over already existing, less expensive alternatives. The NDA process requires
only that the manufacturer show the eﬃcacy and safety of its product relative to a placebo. Voluntary
comparative testing is very rare because the risk of results that show no average beneﬁt over existing drugs
(and the likely corresponding reduction in sales) discourages manufacturers from conducting comparative
trials. While comparative data exists for a few drugs, no national organization, public or private, synthesizes
the existing information so as to provide a decision-making tool for physicians.
This lack of information leads to market failures in which the revenues for new drugs are disproportionate
to their value. Drugs with little value may become blockbusters, whereas truly superior drugs which are not
promoted by marketing campaigns are under-rewarded. The few comparative studies that have been com-
pleted suggest that lack of comparative data leads to substantial ineﬃcient allocation of healthcare spending.
In 2002, for instance, the NIH published a long-term study which showed that diuretics, an inexpensive class
of drugs that have been in use since the 1950s, were more eﬀective than newer best-selling hypertension drugs
that were still on patent (ACE inhibitors and calcium channel blockers).177 The newer drugs cost 10 to 20
times more than diuretics and are less eﬀective, but thanks to millions spent on marketing campaigns by
177ALLHAT Oﬃcers and Coordinators for the ALLHAT Collaborative Research Group, The Antihypertensive and Lipid-
Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial Major Outcomes in High-Risk Hypertensive Patients Randomized to
Angiotensin-converting Enzyme Inhibitor or Calcium Channel Blocker vs. Diuretic: The Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering
Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT), 288 JAMA 2891 (2002).
61their manufacturers and the absence of comparative data, they became best-sellers.178 The study’s authors
believed that the healthcare system could save billions by starting most hypertension patients on diuretics
before more expensive alternatives are tried.179 This is not to say that the newer drugs are not valuable
for some patients for whom diuretics are ineﬀective; but clearly the absence of comparative data created an
opportunity for manufacturers to market their newer, patent-protected drugs as the latest and best ther-
apy when, in fact, most patients would have been better oﬀ, physically and ﬁnancially, with the older, less
expensive, more eﬀective medication.
Some critics of the current FDA approval process argue that NDA approval of new drugs should be con-
ditioned on demonstrated improvements over existing drugs in head-to-head trials.180 Such improvements
could include greater eﬀectiveness, greater safety, fewer side eﬀects, or substantially greater convenience.181
This argument has some intuitive appeal as it would prevent the mass transfer of patients from oﬀ-patent
medications to newer, on-patent medications that are, for the average patent, no better. A number of coun-
tries whose governments partially or completely subsidize pharmaceutical expenses for their citizens have
developed systems along these lines. British Columbia, for example, does not publicly subsidize prescription
drug sales until manufacturers provide published scientiﬁc evidence of comparative mortality or morbidity
beneﬁt.182 Since coverage decisions are politically-charged, they have been delegated to a university-based
group of scientiﬁc and medical advisors.183 Studies show that when B.C. residents received prescription
drugs, they received those from less costly therapeutic classes, chose low-cost drugs within categories, and
178Melody Peterson, Diuretics’ Value Drowned Out By Trumpeting of Newer Drugs, New York Times, Dec. 18, 2002, at
A32; Editorial, When Cheaper is Also Better, New York Times, Dec. 19, 2002, at A38.
179Merrill Goozner, Editorial, Prescription for Reform, Washington Post, Dec. 1, 2003, at A23.
180Id.; Marcia Angell, The Pharmaceutical Industry – To Whom Is It Accountable?, 342 JAMA 1902 (2002); see also Editorial,
Comparing Prescription Drugs, supra note 6.
181Relman, America’s Other Drug Problem, supra note 52, at 40.
182Special exemptions are made for patients with idiosyncratic needs. Steven Morgan, Ken Bassett, and Barbara Mintzes,
Outcomes-Based Coverage in British Columbia, Health Affairs, May/Jun. 2004, at 273.
183Id., at 270.
62purchased generics more often than citizens of other provinces.184 Similarly, Australia, New Zealand and
the United Kingdom have centralized assessment systems which condition subsidization of particular drugs
on the manufacturer’s demonstration of their comparative eﬀectiveness and/or cost-eﬀectiveness.185
However, setting the regulatory bar this high has a number of important disadvantages. First, the higher
regulatory bar would create disincentives for multiple research eﬀorts within a particular therapeutic class.
As discussed in Part II. B., supra, DiMasi’s research suggests that the prevailing drug development paradigm
is one in which a number of ﬁrms will pursue drugs with similar mechanisms of action before any drug in the
class obtains FDA approval.186 If improvement relative to already-approved drugs is a condition of approval,
this creates a large increase in uncertainty for manufacturers who must not only produce an eﬀective drug,
but also produce a drug that is more eﬀective or safe than drugs their competitors are developing, or be
the ﬁrst of the competitors within a therapeutic class to gain FDA approval. This increase in risk would no
doubt result in fewer approved drugs in each therapeutic class. This may mean that the best medication
for a particular subpopulation, or individual fails the approval process because it is not an improvement
for the larger population or because the manufacturer does not choose to invest the resources necessary to
identify the subpopulation for which it is most eﬀective. In addition, the eﬀect of fewer drugs in a ther-
apeutic class would reduce competition within therapeutic classes, allowing manufacturers more leeway to
charge high prices.187 In addition, a requirement of comparative trials could add substantially to the cost of
trials necessary for FDA approval. If what counts as an approved drug is moving target (as competitors are
granted approvals), a ﬁrm developing a drug will face unexpected modiﬁcations to ongoing clinical trials.188
Making approval contingent on a showing of increased eﬃcacy might also increase the number of subjects
184Id., at 274.
185Steven G. Morgan, Meghan McMahon, Craig Mitton, Elizabeth Roughead, Ray Kirk, Panos Kanavos, and Devidas Menon,
Centralized Drug Review Processes In Australia, Canada, New Zealand, And The United Kingdom, Health Affairs, Mar./Apr.
2006, at 337.
186DiMasi, The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research and Development, supra note 86, at 12-13.
187Robert A. Bohrer, Letter, The Pharmaceutical Industry – To Whom Is It Accountable, 343 New England J. Med. 1415
(2000).
188DiMasi, The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research and Development, supra note 86, at 12-13.
63required.189 On the other hand, industry critics argue that the costs of clinical trials currently reﬂect the
cost of designing trials to beneﬁt the marketing eﬀorts of companies that generate little useful information
for physicians, and that current costs may therefore overstate what is necessary to show health beneﬁts.190
While a showing of comparative improvement sets the bar too high for FDA approval, it should be con-
ditioned on the provision of comparative data showing the drug’s performance relative to the most widely
used alternative. This standard would not require a showing of increased eﬀectiveness or safety, thus reduc-
ing disincentives to developing multiple drugs in a therapeutic class. On the other hand, a requirement of
comparative data would make it harder for pharmaceutical companies to market their new drugs as improve-
ments without substantial evidence showing improvement, and thus could be expected to depress revenues
from drugs which are not improvements for the average patient. Some disincentive to developing competing
drugs for a particular indication would therefore remain.
Alternatively or concurrently, incentives could be designed to encourage voluntary comparative testing. In
that scenario, it seems likely that no ﬁrm would submit comparative data unless it showed an improve-
ment or unless the FDA regulations included a requirement that manufacturers submit data from all trials
sponsored by the manufacturer. If most NDAs included comparative data, the absence of such data could
signal to physicians that no improvement over existing drugs is likely. The FDA has some experience with
providing incentives for additional research through the pediatric testing provisions of the 1997 Food and
Drug Modernization Act (“FDAMA”). FDAMA oﬀered a 6-month extension of marketing exclusivity in
return for pediatric testing.191 The FDAMA incentive resulted in only a modest increase in the percentage
of drugs tested in children,192 while providing participating pharmaceutical manufacturers with additional
189Thomas A. Hayes, Letter, The Pharmaceutical Industry – To Whom Is It Accountable, 343 New England J. Med. 1415
(2000).
190Goozner, Prescription for Reform, supra note 179.
191Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 111, 111 Stat. 2296, 2305-09 (codiﬁed
as amended in 21 U.S.C.).
192Lauren H. Breslow, Note, The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002: The Rise of the Voluntary Incentive
Structure and Congressional Refusal to Require Pediatric Testing, 40 Harvard J. Legislation 133, 158-59 (2003) (comparing
64revenues far in excess of the costs of the pediatric testing.193 Scholarship identiﬁed several ﬂaws in the pedi-
atric incentive provisions, including failure to address oﬀ-patent and oﬀ-exclusivity drugs, failure to promote
testing in small markets, and limited capacity to ensure labeling and dissemination of information.194 This
experience with pediatric testing suggests that purely voluntary testing would not be enough to promote
transformational change in the availability of comparative data. Indeed, less industry response might be
expected to a voluntary incentive for comparative testing, since the risk to revenue is probably substantially
greater for comparative testing of drugs than for pediatric testing.
The modest impact of providing incentives in the pediatric context on the availability of subpopulation
information suggests that comparative testing ought to be a mandatory rather than voluntary part of NDA
approval. The purpose of such a requirement would not be to prevent drug approvals for less cost-eﬀective
drugs, but to inform physician decision-making and therefore to increase the likelihood that blockbuster
proﬁts will not be earned by drugs which do not provide an improvement for a substantial population of
patients. In this scenario, the makers of the most eﬀective drugs will be duly rewarded, even in the absence
of marketing campaigns.
A system of incentives might be added such that additional testing to identify the subpopulations in which a
drug is particularly eﬀective is rewarded, even if the resulting market is quite limited. An increase in the ex-
clusivity period could be triggered by comparative data which shows signiﬁcant improvements in identiﬁable
populations, such as minorities, women, or people with particular genotypes.195 Research standards would
have to be issued to identify the characteristics of valuable data. For example, incentives should not reward
“comparative” studies like the Nexium-Prilosec trial in which a double dose of Nexium was compared to a
Senate Report stating that, in 1997, Congress enacted pediatric testing provisions of FDAMA in response to the fact of only
20% of medications having been tested in children to GAO report that in 2001, 25% of medications had been tested in children).
193The Wall Street Journal reported the following revenues: Claritin $ 975 million, Prozac $ 831 million, Glucophage $ 648
million, Pepcid $ 290 million, Vasotec $ 318 million, and Buspar $ 284 million. According to a 2001 GAO report, PhRMA
estimated trial costs at $5-$35 million, while other research organizations estimated far lower costs. Id., at 168 fn301 (2003).
194Id., at 165.
195This data would have to be submitted at time of NDA to prevent incentive to stagger studies to extend exclusivity period
ad inﬁnitum. On the other hand, policy-makers may need to allow some ﬂexibility to prevent delays in initial drug approval.
65single dose of Prilosec.
Institutional Considerations – Who Should Provide Comparative Data?
Assuming that a system of mandatory comparative testing and voluntary incentives for testing in subpopu-
lations were instituted, this would raise an issue of which institutions ought to be providing and reviewing
the data. One possibility would be to expand on the current NDA process such that the FDA is charged with
regulating study design and assessing studies submitted by manufacturers. Public choice theory, however,
suggests that an FDA-controlled process would create opportunities for special interest lobbying and agency
capture.196 Furthermore, empirical studies have shown that manufacturer-sponsored comparative studies
are overwhelmingly likely to favor the manufacturer’s drug.197 For example, the Washington Post reported
that in comparative trials of schizophrenia medications Zyprexa and Risperdal, Zyprexa was found to be
superior in ﬁve of ﬁve trials sponsored by its maker, and Risperdal was demonstrated to be superior in three
of four trials sponsored by its maker.198 A broader study of schizophrenia medications found that 90% of
published head-to-head trials sponsored by manufacturers show that the sponsor’s drug is superior.199 Possi-
ble sources of bias included doses and dose escalation, study entry criteria and study populations, misleading
196Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1637 (2003).
197Timothy R. Howe, Patentability of Pioneering Pharmaceuticals: What’s the Use?, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 819, 819 fn. 2
(citing Joel Lexchin, Lisa A. Bero, Benjamin Djulbegovic, and Otavio Clark, Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research
Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, British Medical Journal, May 31, 2003, at 1-10; and Justin E. Bekelman, Yan
Li and Cary P. Gross, Scope and Impact of Financial Conﬂicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 289 JAMA 454 (2003).
198Shankar Vedantam, Comparison of Schizophrenia Drugs Often Favors Firm Funding Study, Washington Post, Apr.
12, 2006, at p. A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/11/AR2006041101478.html
(last accessed Apr. 13, 2006).
199Stephan Heres, M.D., John Davis, M.D., Katja Maino, M.D., Elisabeth Jetzinger, M.D., Werner
Kissling, M.D. and Stefan Leucht, M.D., Why Olanzapine Beats Risperidone, Risperidone Beats Que-
tiapine, and Quetiapine Beats Olanzapine: An Exploratory Analysis of Head-to-Head Comparison
Studies of Second-Generation Antipsychotics, 163 Am. J. Psychiatry 185-194 (2006), available at
http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/abstract/163/2/185?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=1&author1=davis&andorexacttitle=and&andorexacttitleabs=and&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&sortspec=relevance&resourcetype=HWCIT
(last accessed Apr. 12, 2006).
66uses of statistical methods, and reporting of results and wording of ﬁndings.200 Large purchasers may also
be interested in sponsoring research, though one might suspect that their studies would show a systematic
bias towards disfavoring more expensive drugs.
Scholars in the ﬁeld have advocated for both research and assessment by independent researchers. Healthcare
economist Uwe Reinhardt argues that any data provided by manufacturer-funded or insurer-funded stud-
ies would not be trusted and recommends allocating government funding for cost-eﬀectiveness studies by
independent researchers.201 Third party payers could then use this data to develop reimbursement criteria
that promote cost-eﬀective utilization by patients and physicians. Similarly, Brigham and Womens’ Hospi-
tal’s chief of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics Jerry Avorn, M.D. argues that a government
entity probably could not supply objective assessments of eﬀectiveness, since manufacturers have powerful
incentives to ensure that agencies do not issue revenue-crippling ﬁndings about a new drug’s relative lack of
eﬃcacy (or even comparable eﬃcacy with less of a track record for safety). Avorn therefore suggests private
sector actors be charged with information gathering and dissemination.202
Mandatory testing by independent researchers would require some form of federal funding. Currently, there
is limited federal funding for comparative eﬀectiveness research, and expansion of funding is opposed by the
pharmaceutical industry.203 In academia, some independent research collaboratives produce and synthesize
comparative data, but not on the scale needed to make signiﬁcant changes in physician practice patterns.
The Drug Eﬀectiveness Review Project (“DERP”) at the Oregon Evidence-Based Practice Center, an aca-
demic collaboration that receives some federal funding, is perhaps the best known of these initiatives. It
conducts reviews of comparative eﬀectiveness data for major therapeutic classes.204 DERP’s reach is limited,
200Id.
201Uwe E. Reinhardt, Perspective: An Information Infrastructure for the Pharmaceutical Market, Health Affairs, Jan./Feb.
2004, at 107-112.
202Jerry Avorn, Powerful Medicines, supra note 17, at 366-68.
203Editorial, Comparing Prescription Drugs, supra note 6.
204http://www.ohsu.edu/drugeﬀectiveness/index.htm (last accessed Mar. 28, 2006).
67however, as it does not review all new drugs and it makes no coverage recommendations.205
The necessity for federal funding should be considered in the context of the enormous federal subsidy provided
to the pharmaceutical industry by patent protection. In the absence of meaningful data to distinguish be-
tween important advances and insigniﬁcant advances, the low nonobviousness threshold for pharmaceuticals
“signals a decision to provide massive subsidization of the entire industry.”206 Direct federal subsidization
of trial costs on the other hand would enable explicit judgments about the value of certain innovations and
enable the patent reward to more closely track the actual beneﬁt to society. Well-informed physicians and
patients would be able to make decisions about consumption of prescription drugs that more accurately
reﬂects the value of such drugs to patients. Manufacturers will “automatically factor in the preferences
of informed consumers and their agents (physicians) when making their decisions to initiate or continue
development projects.”207 Informed decision-making, however, presumes that useful information will not
be overwhelmed by manufacturer’s marketing campaigns and thus might require simultaneous funding for
eﬀorts to improve physician education, training, and continuing education.
III. B. Prevention of Double Patenting
The second major problem created by the interaction of market failure, patent law and the Hatch-Waxman
Act is that patents declared invalid for obviousness by the courts, because they fail the Patent Act’s minimal
standard for innovation, are nonetheless valuable revenue-generating or protecting tools for their owners.
As discussed in Part I.C., supra, even a patent whose validity is likely to be successfully challenged on the
205Morgan, Centralized Drug Review Processes In Australia, Canada, New Zealand, And The United Kingdom, supra note
185.
206See Michael H. Davis, Patent Politics, 56 S.C.L. Rev. 337, 369 (2004).
207DiMasi, The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research and Development, supra note 86, at 13.
68merits triggers an automatic stay on generic entry, which results in an extra two and half years of artiﬁcially-
enhanced revenues for the patent holder. This means that even a very high standard for nonobviousness
applied by the courts (as opposed to the PTO) cannot completely prevent this phenomenon. However, there
are opportunities to reduce the frequency of issuance of patents that are likely to be invalidated. In order
to address this issue, policymakers could change the standard of nonobviousness applied by the PTO during
the patent issuance process, make changes to the review process itself, and/or create disincentives to ﬁling
applications for weak patents.
III. B. 1. Standards for Nonbviousness and Double Patenting
Changing the standard of nonobviousness applied by the PTO is one possible mechanism for reducing the
payoﬀ for incremental innovations. The PTO endeavors to apply the standard of nonobviousness developed
by the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit.208 If a drug is obvious as deﬁned by the courts, in light of a
previously patented drug, it should, in theory, be impossible to obtain a patent. The courts have developed
a doctrine of “double patenting” that prohibits the extension of patent term by subsequently patenting a
putatively diﬀerent drug that is indistinct from a drug claimed in an earlier patent. Double patenting doctrine
precludes one person from obtaining more than one patent for the same invention or obvious modiﬁcations
of the same invention.209 This doctrine has two basic rationales. First, the doctrine prevents patent term
extension past the statutory limit of 20 years. The Federal Circuit has stated that the basic concept of double
patenting is that an already-patented invention or obvious variants thereof cannot be re-patented, since the
second issued patent would result in the extension of patent protection for the ﬁrst invention beyond the
208United States Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, §2142, (2001, rev. 2005),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/oﬃces/pac/mpep/mpep.htm [hereinafter MPEP].
209Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents, §9.01 (2005).
69statutory term.210 A second concern is that even multiple patents issued on the same day for the same
invention or obvious variants thereof, which do not extend patent term, can be the basis of multiple suits
against an alleged infringer.211 The double patenting doctrine has not been codiﬁed in the statute, but the
Supreme Court has found it implicit in the statutory language that two valid patents cannot be issued for
the same invention to either the same or diﬀerent parties.212 The double patenting inquiry thus would seem
to preclude the patenting of many of the types of compounds or methods which give rise to the evergreening
phenomenon. For instance, in the case of Prilosec and Nexium, one might anticipate that the patent for the
puriﬁed isomer Nexium would be invalid for double patenting, if it yields no unexpected results relative to
its parent compound.
The test for an obvious modiﬁcation giving rise to a ﬁnding of double patenting is basically the same as the
nonobviousness requirement of patentability (though with a few distinct diﬀerences).213 Given that the PTO
endeavors to follow the obviousness standards deﬁned by the Federal Circuit, this doctrine should bar the
issuance of patents that would later be vulnerable to challenges on double patenting grounds. The statutory
requirement of nonobviousness states that a patent cannot issue if
the diﬀerences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.214
In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court articulated the analysis for determining whether an
invention is nonobvious as follows:
210General Foods Corp. v. Studiegesellschaft Kohle mhH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
211Chisum, Chisum on Patents, §9.02[3], supra note 209.
212Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 US 186, 197 fn2 (1894). Miller is the leading Supreme Court case since it is the only one
with a full discussion of the subject. Chisum, Chisum on Patents, §9.02[6], supra note 209.
213Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1378 fn. 1 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (First, obviousness compares
claimed subject matter to the prior art, whereas double patenting compares claims in an earlier patent to claims in a later patent
or application. Second, obviousness analysis requires an inquiry into a motivation to modify the prior art; double patenting
analysis does not. Third, obviousness analysis requires in inquiry into objective indicia of nonobviousness, but double patenting
analysis does not.) Also see generally, Chisum, Chisum on Patents, §9.01[1], 9.03[3][c], supra note 209.
70...the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; diﬀerences between prior art
and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the perti-
nent art resolved. This requirement is meant to distinguish inventions that are worthy of a
patent from those that are not on the basis of their degree of technical advance over prior art.
Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is deter-
mined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, etc. might be utilized... [a]s indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness...215
Thus, the nonobviousness requirement calls for an inquiry into the degree to which an invention is a signiﬁcant
technical advance over already available technology in the relevant ﬁeld. This suggests that one possible
policy solution for the concerns raised by evergreening might be to raise the standard for nonobviousness
applied by the PTO. 216
The obviousness standard is set at a particularly low level for chemical inventions. In In re Dillon, the Federal
Circuit held that structural similarity where the prior art gives motivation to create the claimed compound
creates a presumption of obviousness, but the presumption may be rebutted by proof of unexpectedly
improved properties or properties that the prior art does not have.217 The court in In re Papesch, had
stated that nonobviousness is not established conclusively if the unexpected property is a “mere diﬀerence
in degree” of the same desired property relied on for patentability in the new compound.218 Later decisions,
however, extended the concept of “unexpected properties” to embrace “signiﬁcant diﬀerences in degree of
the same property amounting to marked superiority.”219 In In re Soni, the Federal Court appeared to lower
216The standard of nonobviousness has been widely criticized as being too low as a general matter across all industries.
See e.g. John H. Barton, Nonobviousness, 43 IDEA 475 (2003). Eﬀorts are currently under way to increase the standard
of nonobviousness by eliminating the Federal Circuit’s requirement of a showing of a “motivation to combine” to establish
obviousness. Where the invention comprises a combination of teachings in prior art, the courts will inquire into whether the
prior art suggests, either implicitly or explicitly, a “motivation to combine” in order to determine whether the invention is obvious
as a matter of law. This has lead to concern that patents are inappropriately granted to otherwise obvious inventions, because
“[p]atent examiners and after-grant challengers will often be unable to ﬁnd a speciﬁc ‘suggestion, teaching, or motivation’ for a
particular combination of existing elements, even if that combination is not innovative. In many cases, it would be so natural
for a person of ordinary skill in the art to use two existing elements together in appropriate circumstances that no one would
think of articulating explicitly the kind of ‘suggestion, teaching, or motivation’ that the Federal Circuit requires.” KSR Intl’l
v. Teleﬂex Inc., No. 04-1152, Brief of Twenty Four Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, at 11. Also see KSR Intl’l v. Teleﬂex Inc., No. 04-1152, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, April 6, 2005.
217919 F.2d 688, 692-93 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Also see Chisum, Chisum on Patents, §5.04[6][d] &[e], supra note 209.
218In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
219Chisum, Chisum on Patents, §5.04[6][e], supra note 209 (citing In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341, 1344 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
71the bar further when it stated that while “mere improvement in properties does not always suﬃce to show
unexpected results... when an applicant demonstrates substantially improved results... and states that the
results were unexpected, this should suﬃce to establish unexpected results in the absence of evidence to the
contrary” (emphasis added).220 Although the court stated that unexpected results must be established by
objective evidence, not mere argument or conclusory statements (and has been cited for this proposition
by subsequent cases), the court appeared to have accepted a mere statement of unexpectedness by the
manufacturer as a suﬃcient showing to rebut the prima facie case for nonobviousness.221
Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceuticals Inc.v. Mylan Labs., Inc. provides a recent case study of the application
of the nonobviousness test in the context of stereoisomers (categorized in Part II , supra, as “obvious to
try” and low or substantial beneﬁt).222 The brand name manufacturer, Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceuticals ﬁrst
patented a racemic mixture of its antibiotic, and later patented the puriﬁed active stereoisomer. Generic
manufacturer Mylan challenged the patent for the puriﬁed stereoisomer as invalid for obviousness. The
court concluded that the challenger did not establish a prima facie case of obviousness. While conceding
that the prior art in 1985 suggested that one of the sterioisomers would be more potent than the racemate
and that there was suﬃcient guidance in the prior art to produce a puriﬁed stereoisomer, the court reasoned
that a skilled artisan would not have reasonably expected the puriﬁed stereoisomer to exhibit its unique
combination of properties. The court emphasized that while it was well-established in the prior art that one
of the puriﬁed stereoisomers in a racemate is usually more potent than the racemate, potency usually varies
directly with toxicity, so a puriﬁed stereoisomer that is both more pure and less toxic than the racemate
was not expected.223 In addition, the court noted that the prior art suggested a range of possible potencies
220In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
221Id., at 750.
222Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceuticals Inc.v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D.W.V. 2004)
223Id., at 753-755.
72but did not teach that the puriﬁed stereoisomer is consistently twice as potent as the racemate, as was
true for the compound at issue.224 The court concluded that to prove obviousness, the challenger must
show that, as of the date of invention, “the prior art would not only motivate a person of ordinary skill in
the art to make [the compound], but also reasonably suggest that the compound would exhibit its unique
combination of properties.”225 This seems like a particularly low standard for nonobviousness given that it is
well-established in the pharmaceutical ﬁeld that one of the stereoisomers in a racemate is usually responsible
for the therapeutic eﬀect of the drug.
Economic analysis of the pattern of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is necessary to determine
whether the low standard of nonobviousness currently applied by the Federal Circuit is set at the correct
level to maximize incentives to invention. Robert Merges developed the classic economic analysis of the
nonobviousness standard, which describes it as a function of the uncertainty facing the inventor.226 Merges
analyzes invention as a two-step process: ﬁrst, the inventor makes some initial assessment of potential returns
from an invention prior to beginning experimentation. Then, the inventor decides whether to develop the
invention or abandon it.227 At each stage, the inventor makes a decision based on the expected value of the
project. By increasing the expected payoﬀ, the patent increases the expected value of the project and may in
some cases turn a project with an otherwise negative expected value into a project with a positive expected
value. Through the use of a simple mathematical model, Merges argues that the availability of a patent has
an even greater eﬀect on the decision about whether to develop an invention into a commercial product than
it does on the decision about whether to pursue initial experimentation.228 He then argues that the standard
of nonobviousness should “reward[]one who successfully invents when the uncertainty facing her prior to the
224Id., at 754.
225Id., at 749 (emphasis added).
226Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 High Tech. L. J. 1, 20 (1993).
227Id., at 21.
228Id., at 33.
73invention makes it more likely than not that the invention won’t succeed”229 If the uncertainty facing the
inventor is low, such that the expected value of the project is positive, then there is little social gain from
granting a patent, since the less risky project would be undertaken without the additional social cost of
monopoly prices associated with patent protection. There may be additional social costs associated with
granting patents to low-risk projects if ﬁrms redirect their research away from high-risk invention and toward
less risky projects.”230 It follows from Merges’ proposed standard that the more uncertain the development
of a successful product is, the more patent protection is needed to oﬀset the low expected value of a high-risk
project, and correspondingly, the lower the nonobviousness standard should be. He notes that one objection
to this standard is that this will create incentives for more high-risk research, which will displace low-risk
research. Merges responds that this is likely true, but if the social rate of return is higher from high-risk
endeavors, then this is a good result.231 (It is important to note though that his proposed standard does
not rest on the veracity of this inference.)
Merges carves out an exception to the direct relationship between uncertainty and the nonobviousness
standard for cases in which there is a high certainty of success, but which involve very high experimentation
costs. Merges argues that patents should be easier to obtain for the results of high-cost research projects
than they are for low-cost projects.232 Higher costs decrease the expected value of a research project. In
order to oﬀset the decrease in expected value due to high costs, the ﬁrm investing in the project will consider
the payoﬀ, which is a function of the degree to which it can appropriate the beneﬁts of the invention.233
A lower standard for patentability, which increases the expected value of the project, is thus necessary to
create an incentive for high-cost projects.234
229Id., at 20.
230Robert M. Hunt, Nonobviousness and the Incentive to Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual
Property Reform (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Research Dept. Working Paper No. 99-3, Mar. 1999)
http://www.phil.frb.org/ﬁles/wps/1999/wp99-3.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2006), at 11.
231Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, supra note 226, at 20.
232Id., at 57.
233Id., at 62.
234Id.
74Pharmaceutical invention appears to be a paradigmatic case of a high-risk, high-cost invention. For virtually
all break-through drugs and many follow-on drugs, development of a commercial product is high-risk due to
the complexity of living systems, and high-cost because of demanding FDA testing requirements. Thus, if
Merges’ analysis is applied to the pharmaceutical industry, it would suggest that a low standard of obviousness
is appropriate. The current low standard in Fed Cir., discussed in above, is consistent with this analysis.
Other drugs, however, can be fairly characterized as low-risk, such as a puriﬁed metabolite of a drug that is
known to be safe and eﬀective. The question begged is whether a low standard of nonobviousness, applied
at the industry level, would then allow patent protection for drugs that would have been developed in
the absence of patent protection. The likely answer is no, given the special circumstances faced by the
pharmaceutical industry. A new drug, however probable it is to succeed, nonetheless must meet FDA
testing requirements before it can be commercialized. This means that drug companies face substantial
costs to develop even products that are virtually certain to pass the requirements for commercialization.
The expected value of such projects, however, would signiﬁcantly decline in the absence of patent protection
because generic competitors face only the less costly ANDA process in order to copy and commercialize the
inventor’s product. We might then expect some number of low-risk drugs never to be developed if a higher
standard for nonobviousness were applied to them. Thus, if the development of high-value, low-uncertainty
drugs is desirable, the application of Merges’ theory (particularly his analysis of high-cost invention) suggests
that a low standard of nonobviousness is appropriate.
An economic model developed by Hunt also suggests that a low obviousness standard is appropriate for the
pharmaceutical industry. Hunt divides the incentive eﬀect of the nonobviousness standard into a “static”
eﬀect and a “dynamic” eﬀect.235 He argues that most economic analysis of nonobviousness focuses on the
“static” eﬀect, which as Merges describes, means that increasing the standard decreases the probability of a
235Hunt, Nonobviousness and the Incentive to Innovate, supra note 230, at 4.
75patent and therefore decreases the expected value of innovation. The “dynamic” eﬀect of the nonobviousness
standard, by contrast, is that as the standard increases, the value of the patent increases so the expected
value of the innovation increases. Expected value increases under a strong nonobviousness requirement
because if the standard is high
... only a small proportion of future discoveries is protected. Today’s patent holder can
copy most of the emerging discoveries. Competing proprietary technologies take longer to
accumulate so the patent holder’s proﬁts are larger and last longer. Thus, holding the
rate of innovation constant, the economic life of patents is increasing [with] the standard of
nonobviousness. This suggests that the value of patents is increasing [with] the strictness of
the nonobviousness requirement.236
Which of these two eﬀects predominates, depends on a number of variables, especially the pace of innovation
in the industry. Hunt contends that Merges’ analysis, which focuses on the static eﬀect, is least appropriate
in rapidly innovating industries and most appropriate in industries in which products are introduced at a
slow rate:237
As the nonobviousness requirement is made more strict, ﬁrms encounter the following trade-
oﬀ. On the one hand, a ﬁrm that makes a marginal discovery fails to obtain a patent and
continues as a challenger in the next race. It loses the associated proﬁt and the cost of R&D
spending it would have avoided for the length of the next race.... When patentable discov-
eries are infrequent, these losses are relatively large. But when patentable discoveries occur
frequently, the value of these losses is smaller. On the other hand, a stricter nonobviousness
requirement raises the average ﬂow proﬁt of patentable discoveries. The associated gain
[increases with] the frequency of patentable discoveries. The net eﬀect is a weighted average
of these cash ﬂow gains and losses, where the weights are determined by the industrywide
arrival rate of patentable discoveries.238
As an empirical matter, it is not clear whether the static or dynamic eﬀect of the standard of nonobvious-
ness predominates in the pharmaceutical industry. However, given the ineherent complexity of biological
systems and the FDA testing required for commercialization, the pharmaceutical industry most likely ﬁts
the model of a slow innovator. So, even if Hunt’s model more accurately depicts the eﬀect of the standard
of nonobviousness on incentives for innovation, it would still likely support a low standard of obviousness.
237Id., at 4.
76Consistent with this analysis, Dan Burke and Mark Lemley ﬁnd that the application of Merges’ theory to
that ﬁeld would make a low standard of nonobviousness sensible in the biotechnology and small molecule
pharmaceutical ﬁelds.239
However, rather than endorsing a low standard of nonobviousness, Burk and Lemley propose that investment
in ﬁelds which development is high-cost and high-risk can be better promoted by broadening patent scope.240
A broader patent increases the expected value of an invention by increasing the value of a patent once it is
granted (by excluding more competition), rather than by increasing the probability of getting a patent.241
An increased probability of getting a patent, they contend, is an inferior means of fostering innovation in
high-cost, high-risk industries, because it creates an additional incentive only for projects which are rela-
tively low-risk and low-uncertainty. An increased probability of getting a patent does nothing to increase the
expected value of a high-risk project that would pass even a high nonobviousness threshold, but a broader
patent scope would increase the payoﬀ to such inventions.
One way to analyze Burke and Lemley’s and Merges’ theories in the context of the pharmaceutical industry is
to ask what eﬀect they would have on incentives in light of the current regulatory structure, particularly the
Hatch-Waxman Act. The answers will likely vary depending on whether markets for drugs are functioning
well (in the sense that the revenues from drugs reﬂected their value to those who buy them). This discussion
will assume that some set of reforms, such as the requirement of comparative testing discussed in Part III.
239Burk, Policy Levers in Patent Law, supra note 196, at 1677-78.
240Id., at 1676-77, 1681-1682. Such broadening could occur by reducing the disclosure requirement or by strengthening the
doctrine of equivalents. The disclosure requirement of the Patent Act establishes that the patent applicant must provide a
“written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. The speciﬁcation
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. §112 (2006). The analysis which the PTO and the courts use to determine whether the
products claimed by a patent are enabled within the meaning of the statute can determine whether the patent has a broad or
narrow scope. See Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Columb. L.
Rev. 839, 845-49 (1990). Similarly, application of the doctrine of equivalents may be used to broaden or narrow patent scope.
The doctrine is applied during the claim construction process of infringement suits to allow some range of products, which do
not literally infringe the claims of the patent, to be considered as encompassed by the claims. Application of this doctrine,
therefore, broadens the reach of patent claims. See id., at 852-860.
241Burk, Policy Levers in Patent Law, supra note 196, at 1681.
77A., supra, are in place, so that physician and patient decision-making reﬂects accurate information about
the beneﬁts of the drugs available to them. Thus, this discussion will assume that patients will not choose
drugs that are more expensive, but oﬀer them no additional beneﬁt, over a competing drug.
As discussed in Part II. C., infra, the patent system should be designed to promote the development of
drugs with the most substantial beneﬁts to patients. This degree of beneﬁt will be based both on inherent
properties of the drug and the work that the manufacturer has done to identify patients likely to beneﬁt
most from it. If markets are working properly, drugs with expected insigniﬁcant or low social value, will
probably not be developed regardless of the patent scope or patentability standards, since expected returns
to the manufacturer will not overcome the costs of required FDA testing. This category might sweep in
some inventions which would substantially beneﬁt some patients, but where those populations of patients
are small and/or unidentiﬁed.242
Arguably, a high obviousness standard in combination with broader patent scope would provide greater in-
centives to develop innovative drugs that have the greatest social value. Under the current standards, these
drugs meet the nonobviousness standard, so the expected value of development already reﬂects monopoly
prices. However, it is not clear that the incentives to innovate are strong enough. Pharmaceutical manu-
facturers can plausibly argue that even with patent term restoration and market exclusivity, the expected
rewards must include revenues not only from the original new drug, but also revenues from incremental
modiﬁcations to these drugs in order to achieve a positive expected value in light of the cost of required
testing and enormous uncertainty. An increase in the nonobviousness standard accompanied by an increase
in patent scope, however, would likely achieve greater returns for the most innovative drugs. Broader patent
242One important objection to this approach is that drugs that are no better for the average patient may nonetheless be
better for particular individual patients, so society is better oﬀ if we have many options for treating a disease even if there is no
reliable data about for whom a new drug is any better than its predecessors. Drugs like this present a problem similar to drugs
for whom populations are too small to make the expected value of a development project positive (“orphan drugs”). As with
orphan drugs, they may require a separate regulatory solution, possibly via direct subsidization, about which explicit political
judgments can be made.
78scope would increase the expected value of the drug, by encompassing some incremental improvements that
currently require a second patent in order to be protected. If it is these drugs that public policy should most
strongly promote, then a grant of broader patent scope makes sense.
One objection to broad patents is that they deter innovation by preventing other inventors from compet-
ing with the patent holder in a larger range of products than a narrow patent would. Merges and Nelson
argue that broader patents do not always increase incentives to invent. Rather, they may do so for some
pioneers, but then diminish the incentives for later inventors who seek to improve a product.243 In contrast,
Edmund Kitch, who developed the “prospect theory” of patent law, argued that a broad patent promotes
improvements by giving the pioneer inventor an incentive to make investments in improving the subject
of his patent without the risk that the investment would result in “unpatentable information appropriable
by competitors.”244 Furthermore, he argued that a broad patent can increase the eﬃciency of investment
in improvements, since a broad patent right puts the pioneer patent holder in the position of being able
to coordinate the search for improvements (thus avoiding duplicative research eﬀorts) by developing the
product itself or licensing. In the context of small improvements to a drug, for example, by new delivery
methods or doses, it makes intuitive sense that the original patent holder would be best situated to make
such improvements. Given the uniquely high costs of development, the original inventor may have the best
information on which to base improvements.245 In sum, this analysis suggests that the best way to provide
incentives for break-through innovation is to raise the bar for nonobviousness and expand patent scope.
We might then consider how a higher standard of nonobviousness and broader patent scope would aﬀect
drugs with substantial or great social value that meet the current nonobviousness standard, but would not
meet a substantially raised standard. Two outcomes seem possible. One is that these inventions would not
243Merges, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, supra note 240, at 916.
244Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, in Foundations of Intellectual Property Law,
140, 146 (Robert P. Merges and Jane C. Ginsburg, eds., 2004).
245See generally, Burk, Policy Levers in Patent Law, supra note 196, at 1686.
79be patentable and therefore would remain undeveloped, since monopoly prices would not be available to
oﬀset the costs of required FDA testing. On the other hand, this likely outcome would encourage inven-
tors to include claims in the original patent for likely modiﬁcations of the drug (e.g., puriﬁed stereoisomers
and metabolites). This would increase the amount of research that would have to precede patenting, but
a relaxed enablement requirement would make the required eﬀort less burdensome. This might have the
beneﬁcial eﬀect of encouraging improvements to be developed sooner rather than only as the original patent
was nearing expiration.
The current standards of patentability do not promote drugs with substantial or great social value that
do not meet the current standard for nonobviousness. Although in theory inventive eﬀorts that produce
an obvious result require no incentive other than that which the market provides, in the context of costly
testing requirements, even the availability of a substantial consumer base may not be enough to result in a
positive expected value. A higher standard of nonobviousness increases the number of drugs which fall into
this category.
Thus, neither approach seems ideal. On the one hand, a higher standard of nonobviousness may mean that
some less innovative, but high-value drugs will not be developed, and the degree to which increased patent
scope can oﬀset this eﬀect is uncertain; on the other hand, a higher standard in conjunction with broad
patent scope will increase the expected value of innovative, high-value drugs and provide greater incentives
for their development. The existence of the potential for using patents on small improvements as a means
of triggering a stay on generic competition under Hatch-Waxman, however, might counsel us to place more
weight on the option that provides the least opportunity for evergreening practices described in Part I. D.
2, supra. Certainly, the grant of fewer patents would mitigate this issue by reducing the likelihood that
patents would issue for small modiﬁcations to an existing drug. In the absence of such patents, the man-
ufacturer’s economic hold on a drug would more likely expire at the time that the original patent expires.
80Given substantial uncertainty about the eﬀect of changing the standard of nonobviousness, however, other
policy solutions to the problem of optimally promoting innovation and preventing double patenting are more
clearly beneﬁcial, until substantially more detailed economic modeling of the eﬀects of patentability and
patent scope on the industry become available.
III. B. 2. Reducing the Payoﬀ from Invalid Patents / Prevention
of Double Patenting
Another question that seems to arise from the proliferation of patents on trivial improvements, particularly
those that are over-turned by the courts, is why such improvements are not barred by the PTO’s examination
of the patent application. Even if the standard of obviousness applied by the courts is low, patents should
ideally not issue if they do not meet that standard. The unique and substantial social costs associated with
erroneously-issued pharmaceutical patents suggests that reforms to the PTO’s patent application review
process are particularly urgent in this context, and that penalties for double patenting should be considered.
Much concern has been expressed in recent years regarding the poor quality of issued patents. In an ideal
world, the PTO would never issue a patent that could not meet the Federal Circuit’s standards. As a
practical matter, however, the PTO operates with limited resources to review hundreds of thousands of
patent applications per year, and some error rate is inevitable. Currently, there is evidence that this error rate
is unacceptably high. Although the Federal Circuit has been described as “pro-patent” and even captured
by business interests, in cases in which patent validity is challenged on appeal, it nonetheless overturns or
aﬃrms the overturning of patent claims for invalidity in 46% of the cases that reach it.246 Self-selection bias
246See Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an Ambulance,
69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 525, 539 (1995) (Federal Circuit capture); Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-
Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 595, 614 n.86 (1993) (describing
the Federal Circuit as pro-patent); Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation, supra note 92, Chapter 5, at 6.
81likely causes challenges to patent validity to be appealed only where patents are particularly questionable
and thus the 46% rate likely overstates the overall PTO error rate. However, in the pharmaceutical ﬁeld
where the Hatch-Waxman provisions create ﬁnancial rewards to patent owners for patents issued in error,
one might expect erroneously-issued patents to be particularly numerous.
The patent application process in the PTO is commonly described as “cursory,” suggesting a tendency to err
on the side of issuance.247 A study by the National Academies of Science (“NAS”) reported that the number
of patent applications doubled in the 1990s, but the number of examiners available to review them did not
keep pace.248 Estimates of the current average total time spent by an examiner on a patent prosecution
(including time to read and understand the application, evaluate the application, and communicate with the
applicant) range from 8 to 25 hours.249 The examiner thus has limited time for evaluation, and given that
the applicant is not required to search the prior art for relevant material and provide it to the examiner,
the examiner may not uncover all of it.250 Some error rate in patent issuance is thus to be expected: it
would be unrealistic to think that review of a patent by the PTO would be as searching as what occurs in
patent litigation. However, the high approval rates give cause for concern. In his statement to the FTC,
Cecil Quillen contended that when the PTO’s approval rate was adjusted for the eﬀects of continuation
applications and continuations in part, it was 98% in 2000.251 In contrast, the rates in Europe and Japan
were 67% and 64%, respectively.252 One observer concluded, “[p]atent oﬃce statistics themselves establish
that almost any patent lawyer can probably get [a ham sandwich] patented.”253
247See e.g., Davis, Patent Politics, supra note 206, at 370.
248Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin, and Mark B. Myers, Editors, Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the
Knowledge-Based Economy, National Research Council, National Academies of Science, A Patent System for the 21st
Century, 2004, at 41, available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10976.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
249Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation, supra note 92, Chapter 5, at 5.
250The “duty of candor” requires that the applicant reveal prior art of which he is aware to the PTO, but does not require
him to search for prior art.
251The PTO’s Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy Stephan Kunin disputed this estimate. A later article by
PTO legal advisor Robert Clarke put the number at 71-80%.
252Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation, supra note 92, Chapter 5, at 6.
253Davis, Patent Politics, supra note 206, at 370, fn131.
82While acknowledging the substantial PTO error rate, Mark Lemley has argued that the costs of improving
PTO review would outweigh the litigation costs that would be averted by more PTO review:
Because so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is much cheaper for society
to make detailed validity determinations in those few [litigated] cases than to invest addi-
tional resources examining patents that will never be heard from again. In short, the PTO
doesn’t do a very detailed job of examining patents, but we probably don’t want it to.254
Lemley concludes that the PTO’s failure to carefully examine patent applications is a form of “rational
ignorance.”255 Joseph Farrell and Robert Merges have challenged this assertion, arguing that the incentives
inherent in patent litigation, such as severe penalties for unsuccessful challenges to questionable patents
relative to a royalty that would otherwise be paid, result in too few challenges being brought and thus
allow patent holders to extract rewards from their patents that are disproportionate to their patents’ likely
strength.256 They therefore argue for reforms to improve the PTO review process. Even if Lemley’s analysis
more closely reﬂects the general reality of patent litigation, however, it does not factor in the additional costs
of litigation associated with the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Hatch-Waxman Act most likely both increases
the number of lawsuits, and increases the social cost of an invalid patent via the thirty-month stay provision.
Pharmaceutical patents, therefore, include some subset of patents for which social costs are particularly high,
and thus additional PTO review could be economically justiﬁed.
In order to reduce the issuance of patents that are invalid for double patenting, more information is needed
regarding the sources of error. Lemley suggests that much of the error rate is probably due to failure to
identify prior art.257 This, however, is likely a less important source of error in double patenting cases, since
the relevant prior art will consist in large part of the applicant’s prior patents, which the applicant’s duty of
255Id., at 1511.
256Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges, Symposium: Ideas into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System: In-
centives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Oﬃce Errors and Why Administrative
Patent Review Might Help, 19 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 943, 968-69 (2004).
257Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Oﬃce, supra note 254, at 1500.
83candor requires him to present in his application.
One more likely source of error is the particular diﬃculty of applying nonobviousness standard. The nonob-
viousness standard is likely diﬃcult to apply because it takes the form of a hypothetical thought-experiment
in which the examiner is asked to determine what “would have been obvious” to a person of ordinary skill
in the art.258 The Federal Circuit has likened the test to the “reasonable man” in tort law:
With the involved facts determined, the decision-maker confronts a ghost, i.e. “a person
having ordinary skill in the art,” not unlike the “reasonable man” and other ghosts in the
law. To reach a proper conclusion under 102, the decisionmaker must step backward in time
and into the shoes worn by that “person” when the invention was unknown and just before
it was made...259
Michael Davis argues that the analysis required is so indeterminate and ﬂexible that it “gives license to the
courts to roam freely from the facts of a case” and apply their own policy judgments to the case before
them.260 To the extent this is the case, it is not surprising that the PTO makes less than perfect predictions
about the likely application of the standard by the Federal Circuit.
If Federal Circuit results are somewhat predictable, however, the logical response to the diﬃculty of applying
the nonobviousness standard would be to increase the average expenditure on examinations, so as to allot
more time to each examination. Rather than assuming that all patents require a similar amount of exam-
ination time, policymakers could take into account the incentives created by the Hatch-Waxman Act and
allot more examination resources in particular to pharmaceutical patent applications most likely to be later
found invalid for double patenting. These might include all modiﬁcations or uses of compounds for which a
patent is already in existence.
Another possibility would be to reverse the burden of proof such that applicants for patents must show
25835 USC §103(a) (2006).
260Davis, Patent Politics, supra note 206, at 1356-57.
84nonobviousness. Currently, the USTPO Manual of Patent Examining Procedure states that during prosecu-
tion the patent examiner has the burden of showing a prima facie case for obviousness-type double patenting
by applying Graham v. Deere factors.261 This means that applicant need not make a showing of nonobvious-
ness until the examiner has presented a case for rejection due to obviousness.262 The diﬃculty of determining
whether the standard has been met, therefore works in favor of the applicant.263 This is especially troubling
if the PTO is to some degree subject to “capture” by applicants and therefore disinclined to challenge ap-
plicants.264 Although the beneﬁts of reversal of the burden of proof are plainest for pharmaceutical double
patenting, the FTC has argued that the burden of proof is problematic for all patents, particularly given the
ex parte nature of the proceedings.265
Reforms of the PTO examination process, however, may not be suﬃcient to address the problem of double
patenting if the PTO is, as some observers have argued, subject to regulatory capture.266 Under this theory,
the PTO has come to see itself as an agent of patent applicants, rather than a servant of the public interest.
It may therefore be biased towards issuing patents, even if it has suﬃcient time and resources to deny some
that will (or ought to) later be struck down by the courts. If this is the case, some sort of disincentive to
applying for a weak patent may be needed. One possibility would be to impose penalties on patent holders
whose patents are found invalid. In the context of paragraph IV challenges, this penalty could be calibrated
to reﬂect the revenues generated by the patent during the thirty-month stay on generic competition awarded
by the Hatch-Waxman provisions.
Robert Merges has analyzed the possibility of penalties for invalid patents by analogizing the costs of torts
261Emily A. Evans and Jill A. Jacobson, Double Patenting Recapitulated, 87 J. Patent & Trademark Offc. Soc’y 625, 630
(2005) (citing MPEP §804.II.B.1, supra note 208).
262MPEP §2142, supra note 208; also see Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation, supra note 92, Chapter
5, at 8.
263Id.
264Carl Shapiro, Symposium: Ideas into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System: Patent System Reform: Eco-
nomic Analysis and Critique, 19 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1017, 1021-22 (2004).
265Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation, supra note 92, Chapter 5, at 8-10.
266Shapiro, Symposium: Ideas into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System: Patent System Reform: Economic
Analysis and Critique, supra note 264, at 1038.
85to the costs of invalid patents.267 He argues that the PTO is best positioned to bear the cost of preventing
invalid patent for several reasons (i.e. the PTO is the least cost avoider). First, prior art that may later
invalidate a patent may be unavailable to the patent applicant at the time of ﬁling. There may be economies
of scale in allocating the responsibility for prior art searched to the PTO, and it is desirable to shift some of
the costs of prior art searches from small inventor to the PTO.268 The diﬃculty of conducting a thorough
search of the prior art might deter some valuable inventive activity. As discussed above, however, this is
less likely to be a serious concern in cases of double patenting wherein the most critical prior art consists
of the patentee’s own applications. (It might be more problematic in the context of patents challenged for
obviousness rather than obviousness-type double patenting, although most paragraph IV challenges tend to
involve improvements on the patent holder’s own inventions.) Second, Merges argues that there is value in
a system which prevents issuance of weak patents rather than deterring them with post-litigation remedies,
because the high cost of litigation will deter some meritorious challenges.269 Again, this is less concerning
in the context of pharmaceutical double patenting, since Hatch-Waxman provides eﬀective incentives to
generics manufacturers to challenge invalid patents. It therefore seems that paragraph IV litigation is more
amenable than most forms of patent litigation to retroactive remedies for the appropriation of royalties from
the public by means of invalid patents.
In summary, in an era in which Americans are increasingly concerned about the aﬀordability of life-saving
medications, the eﬃcient allocation of healthcare resources should be a priority for healthcare regulators.
The disconnect between the revenues earned from patented pharmaceutical inventions and their likely social
value suggests that current patent and regulatory law is not well-calibrated to reward and encourage the
267Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent
System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 577, 599-600 (1999).
268Id., at 599-600.
269Id., at 600.
86most valuable types of innovation. Pervasive market failures combine with the current regulatory structure
to create a set of perverse investment incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers by over-rewarding some
inventions relative to their value and under-rewarding others. In order to address this set of problems,
policy-makers should consider 1) requiring comparative data in order to qualify for FDA approval, 2) pro-
viding incentives for voluntary testing of subpopulations, 3) increasing the standard of nonobviousness in
conjunction with broadening patent scope, 4) funding more searching review of patent applications by the
PTO and / or reversing the burden of proof in the patent application process for new formulations of known
compounds, and 5) instituting post-litigation remedies for patents found invalid in paragraph IV challenges.
While these possibilities by no means exhaust all the policies that could be brought to bear on the issue of
promoting progress in pharmaceutical research and development, they are illustrative of ways in which the
rewards arising from patent protection and market exclusivity can be designed to more accurately reﬂect the
social value of particular innovations.
87